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When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law

Author

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  • Patrice Bougette

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Marc Deschamps

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Frédéric Marty

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

Abstract

In this article,we use a history of economic thought perspective to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the US. We show the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped antitrust laws in their inception. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of US competition laws, we then highlight US economists' very cautious views about antitrust until the Second New Deal. We analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. We rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm was made collective, i.e. the "economization" process took place in US antitrust. Finally, we discuss the implications, if not the possible pitfalls, of such a conversion to economics - led competition law enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Bougette & Marc Deschamps & Frédéric Marty, 2014. "When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law," Working Papers halshs-01027432, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01027432
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01027432
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    11. Nicola Giocoli, 2015. "Old lady charm: explaining the persistent appeal of Chicago antitrust," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 96-122, March.
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    15. Patrice Bougette & Frédéric Marty & Julien Pillot & Patrice Reis, 2012. "Exclusivity in High-Tech Industries: Evidence from the French Case," Post-Print halshs-00691836, HAL.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Patrice Bougette & Frédéric Marty, 2020. "Information Exchange among Firms: The Coherence of Justice Brandeis' Regulated Competition Approach," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-56, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Feb 2021.
    2. Michael E. Doron, 2023. "Could Accounting Have Saved Itself from the Antitrust Laws?Revisiting the Antitrust Investigations into the US Accounting Profession 1966–1990," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 59(3), pages 847-871, September.
    3. Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2019. "Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn From an Industrial Organization Approach?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 129(2), pages 261-286.
    4. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2020. "The Late Emerging Consensus Among American Economists on Antitrust Laws in the Second New Deal (1935-1941) (Revised Version)," CIRANO Working Papers 2020s-46, CIRANO.
    5. Frédéric Marty, 2020. "Protecting the Competitive Process, not a Competitive Structure - Reflections on the book by Nicolas Petit Big Tech and the Digital Economy," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-51, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    6. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2020. "From the First World War to the National Recovery Administration (1917-1935) - The Case for Regulated Competition in the United States during the Interwar Period," Working Papers halshs-03052417, HAL.
    7. Jean-Luc Gaffard, 2022. "Instabilité et résilience des économies de marché: Essai sur l'économie du libéralisme social," GREDEG Working Papers 2022-33, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    8. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2021. "The late emerging consensus among American economists on antitrust laws in the 2nd New Deal (1935-1941)," Post-Print halshs-03261721, HAL.
    9. Frédéric Marty, 2020. "Is the Consumer Welfare Obsolete? A European Union Competition Law Perspective," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-13, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    10. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2021. "How Law and Economics Was Marketed in a Hostile World: the institutionalization of the field in the United States from the immediate post-war period to the Reagan years," Working Papers halshs-03124774, HAL.
    11. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2019. "The Late Emerging Consensus Among American Economists on Antitrust Laws in the Second New Deal," CIRANO Working Papers 2019s-12, CIRANO.
    12. David Cayla, 2022. "How the Digital Economy Challenges the Neoliberal Agenda: Lessons from the Antitrust Policies," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(2), pages 546-553, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Chicago School; Consumer Welfare; Monopolization; Efficiency; Antitrust; politique de concurrence; bien-être du consommateur; Ecole de Chicago; efficience; abus de position dominante;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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