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Voting Games and Acyclic Collective Choice Rules

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  • Truchon, M.

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  • Truchon, M., 1993. "Voting Games and Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Papers 9315, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:lavape:9315
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ferejohn, John A. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1979. "Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 28-45, August.
    2. Andjiga, Nicolas G. & Moulen, Joel, 1988. "Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 189-201, October.
    3. Donald J. Brown, 1975. "Aggregation of Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 89(3), pages 456-469.
    4. Deb, Rajat, 1981. "k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 899-909, June.
    5. Truchon, Michel, 1996. "Acyclicity and Decisiveness Structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 447-469, May.
    6. Ferejohn, John A. & Grether, David M., 1974. "On a class of rational social decision procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 471-482, August.
    7. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 1-17, February.
    8. Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-943, July.
    9. Bloomfield, Stefan D, 1976. "A Social Choice Interpretation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 105-114, January.
    10. Blau, Julian H & Deb, Rajat, 1977. "Social Decision Functions and the Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 871-879, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2011. "Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 187-201, May.
    2. Munda, Giuseppe, 2009. "A conflict analysis approach for illuminating distributional issues in sustainability policy," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 194(1), pages 307-322, April.
    3. Masahiro Kumabe & H. Reiju Mihara, 2008. "The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 621-640, December.
    4. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 348-366, February.
    5. Truchon, Michel, 1999. "La démocratie : oui, mais laquelle?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 189-214, mars-juin.
    6. Susumu Cato, 2015. "Conditions on social-preference cycles," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(1), pages 1-13, July.
    7. Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel & Mbih, Boniface, 2000. "A note on the core of voting games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 367-372, April.
    8. Azzini, Ivano & Munda, Giuseppe, 2020. "A new approach for identifying the Kemeny median ranking," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 281(2), pages 388-401.
    9. Giuseppe Munda, 2012. "Choosing Aggregation Rules for Composite Indicators," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 109(3), pages 337-354, December.

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    Keywords

    voting ; game theory;

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