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Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions

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  • Sholomov, Lev A.

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  • Sholomov, Lev A., 2000. "Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 81-107, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:39:y:2000:i:1:p:81-107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Blau, Julian H., 1979. "Semiorders and collective choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 195-206, August.
    2. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
    3. Blair, Douglas H. & Pollak, Robert A., 1979. "Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the arrow theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 186-194, August.
    4. Peter C. Fishburn, 1975. "Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(3), pages 415-419.
    5. David Kelsey, 1984. "Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(4), pages 693-699.
    6. B. Monjardet, 1978. "An Axiomatic Theory of Tournament Aggregation," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 3(4), pages 334-351, November.
    7. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 328-328.
    8. Blau, Julian H & Deb, Rajat, 1977. "Social Decision Functions and the Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 871-879, May.
    9. Ferejohn, John A. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1979. "Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 28-45, August.
    10. Donald J. Brown, 1975. "Aggregation of Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 89(3), pages 456-469.
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    Cited by:

    1. Athanasios Andrikopoulos, 2017. "Generalizations of Szpilrajn's Theorem in economic and game theories," Papers 1708.04711, arXiv.org.
    2. McMorris, F. R. & Powers, R. C., 2004. "Consensus functions on tree quasi-orders that satisfy an independence condition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 183-192, September.
    3. Andrikopoulos, Athanasios, 2009. "Szpilrajn-type theorems in economics," MPRA Paper 14345, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Herden, Gerhard & Pallack, Andreas, 2002. "On the continuous analogue of the Szpilrajn Theorem I," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 115-134, March.

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