IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/unm/umamet/1995017.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Strategy-proof preference rules

Author

Listed:
  • Storcken, A.J.A.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Storcken, A.J.A., 1995. "Strategy-proof preference rules," Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:1995017
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.1995017
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1051486/guid-64debe6d-6591-4edd-be6a-b160d7b71a4d-ASSET1.0.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.26481/umamet.1995017?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kim C. Border & J. S. Jordan, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 153-170.
    2. Bandyopadhyay, Taradas, 1983. "Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 359-363, April.
    3. Donald J. Brown, 1975. "Aggregation of Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 89(3), pages 456-469.
    4. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    5. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 1-17, February.
    6. Dutta, Bhaskar, 1982. "Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 113-122, March.
    7. Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-943, July.
    8. Bloomfield, Stefan D, 1976. "A Social Choice Interpretation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 105-114, January.
    9. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2015. "Arrow’s Theorem and its descendants," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 14, pages 237-262, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Truchon M., 1996. "Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 55-55, February.
    3. Pierre Batteau, 1978. "Stability of Aggregation Procedures, Ultrafilters and Simple Games," Discussion Papers 318, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
    5. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2018. "On random social choice functions with the tops-only property," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 413-435.
    6. Aziz, Haris & Chan, Hau & Lee, Barton E. & Parkes, David C., 2020. "The capacity constrained facility location problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 478-490.
    7. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2018. "Strategy-proof location of public facilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 21-48.
    8. Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S., 1998. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 272-291, November.
    9. Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 195-210, August.
    10. BOSSERT, Walter & WEYMARK, J.A., 2006. "Social Choice: Recent Developments," Cahiers de recherche 2006-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    11. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12477 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Tobias Rachidi, 2020. "Optimal Voting Mechanisms on Generalized Single-Peaked Domains," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_214, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    13. Susumu Cato, 2022. "Stable preference aggregation with infinite population," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 287-304, August.
    14. Sumit Goel & Wade Hann-Caruthers, 2023. "Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(1), pages 11-34, July.
    15. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 533-544, July.
    16. ,, 2009. "Strategy-proofness and single-crossing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
    17. Ricardo Martínez & Bernardo Moreno, 2011. "Manipulability in Restricted Separable Domains," Working Papers 2011-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    18. Schummer, James & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2002. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 405-428, June.
    19. Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2021. "A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    20. Mihir Bhattacharya & Ojasvi Khare, 2024. "Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(3), pages 893-911, September.
    21. Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Pär Torstensson, 2008. "Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(2), pages 181-196, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:1995017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Andrea Willems or Leonne Portz (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/meteonl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.