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Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences

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  • Satish Jain

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Satish Jain, 1996. "Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 195-212, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:64:y:1996:i:2:p:195-212
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01250115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jain, Satish K., 1988. "Characterization of monotonicity and neutrality for binary Paretian social decision rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 307-312, June.
    2. Hansson, Bengt, 1969. "Group Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(1), pages 50-54, January.
    3. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "The game-theoretic structure of Arrow's general possibility theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 14-20, August.
    4. Blau, Julian H & Deb, Rajat, 1977. "Social Decision Functions and the Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 871-879, May.
    5. Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-943, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fasil Alemante & Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2016. "Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 765-783, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    binary social decision rules; neutrality; monotonicity; quasi-transitivity; acyclicity; D71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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