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Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice

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  • Sanchez, M.Carmen
  • Peris, Josep E.

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  • Sanchez, M.Carmen & Peris, Josep E., 2006. "Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(7-8), pages 843-853, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:42:y:2006:i:7-8:p:843-853
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter C. Fishburn, 1975. "Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(3), pages 415-419.
    2. Josep E. Peris & M. Carmen Sánchez, 2001. "Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: The fixed agenda framework," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 113-127.
    3. Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-943, July.
    4. Blau, Julian H & Deb, Rajat, 1977. "Social Decision Functions and the Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 871-879, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Duddy, Conal & Piggins, Ashley, 2022. "Collective choice rules with social maximality," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    2. Duddy, Conal & Piggins, Ashley, 2020. "A foundation for Pareto optimality," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 25-30.

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