L’épargne salariale : entre transfert des risques et stabilisation du capital. Examen à partir du cas d’un groupe français de matériaux de construction
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- Patrice Laroche & Mathieu Floquet & Loris Guery & Chloé Guillot-Soulez & Anne Stévenot, 2013.
"Les relations entre épargne salariale et rémunérations : une analyse des stratégies et de la cohérence des pratiques,"
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- Patrice Laroche & Mathieu Floquet & Loris Guery & Chloé Guillot-Soulez & Anne Stévenot, 2013. "Les relations entre épargne salariale et rémunérations: une analyse des stratégies et de la cohérence des pratiques," Post-Print hal-01376120, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
modèle principal-agent; politiques de rémunération; épargne salariale; partage des risques;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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