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Gender Norms in a Simple Model of Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility

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  • Simon Clark

    (School of Economics, University of Edinburgh)

Abstract

I construct a simple matching model that nests transferable utility, nontransferable utility, and imperfectly transferable utility by showing that if the utility possibility frontier of a matched couple satisfies a homogeneity condition it has a CES form, with the elasticity of substitution sigma a measure of the degree of transferability. Taking sigma as exogenous, I analyse how transferability affects sorting and payoffs. Treating social norms as a source of imperfect transferability, I examine the effect of norms about gender roles within the household.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Clark, 2025. "Gender Norms in a Simple Model of Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 314, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    • Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:314
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/id314_esedps.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Echenique, Federico & Galichon, Alfred, 2017. "Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 63-77.
    2. Alfred Galichon & Scott Duke Kominers & Simon Weber, 2019. "Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(6), pages 2875-2925.
    3. Simon Clark, 2003. "Matching and Sorting with Horizontal Heterogeneity," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 94, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    4. Clark Simon, 2006. "The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-30, December.
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    6. H. Peyton Young, 2015. "The Evolution of Social Norms," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 359-387, August.
    7. Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2007. "Beauty is a beast, frog is a prince :assortative matching in a nontransferable world," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7022, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Lasse Eika & Magne Mogstad & Basit Zafar, 2019. "Educational Assortative Mating and Household Income Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(6), pages 2795-2835.
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    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/t2p3rkl1d8gqrqvgeigklj2qg is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Echenique, Federico & Galichon, Alfred, 2017. "Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 63-77.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; marriage market; imperfectly transferable utility; social norms; gender norms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics

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