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Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Echenique

    (CALTECH - California Institute of Technology)

  • Alfred Galichon

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Echenique & Alfred Galichon, 2017. "Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching," Post-Print hal-03261595, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03261595
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. A. Fostel & H. Scarf & M. Todd, 2004. "Two new proofs of Afriat’s theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(1), pages 211-219, July.
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    3. Federico Echenique & Sangmok Lee & Matthew Shum & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 153-171, January.
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    5. Crawford, Vincent P., 2005. "The Flexible-Salary Match: A Proposal to Increase the Salary Flexibility of the National Resident Matching Program," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt2gw114b2, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
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    Cited by:

    1. Doğan, Battal & Yıldız, Kemal, 2016. "Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 47-58.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    market design; matching theory; national resident matching program;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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