Counter-Intelligence in a Command Economy
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- Mark Harrison & Inga Zaksauskienė, 2016. "Counter-intelligence in a command economy," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 69(1), pages 131-158, February.
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- Lichter, Andreas & Löffler, Max & Siegloch, Sebastian, 2015. "The Economic Costs of Mass Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 9245, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Andreas Lichter & Max Löffler & Sebastian Siegloch, 2019. "The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany," ifo Working Paper Series 317, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
- Andreas Lichter & Max Löffler & Sebastian Siegloch, 2016. "The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 865, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- Lichter, Andreas & Löffler, Max & Siegloch, Sebastian, 2019. "The long-term costs of government surveillance: Insights from stasi spying in East Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-049, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Siegloch, Sebastian & Lichter, Andreas & Löffler, Max, 2016. "The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145656, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Andreas Lichter & Max Löffler & Sebastian Siegloch, 2016. "The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 6042, CESifo.
- Harrison, Mark, 2017.
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- Harrison, Mark, 2017. "Secrecy and State Capacity: A Look Behind the Iron Curtain," Economic Research Papers 269312, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Harrison, Mark, 2017. "Secrecy and State Capacity : A Look Behind the Iron Curtain," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1134, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Harrison, Mark, 2015.
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- Harrison, Mark, 2015. "If You Do Not Change Your Behaviour: Managing Threats to State Security in Lithuania under Soviet Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1076, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Harrison, Mark, 2015. "If You Do Not Change Your Behaviour : Managing Threats to State Security in Lithuania under Soviet Rule," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 247, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Otrachshenko, Vladimir & Nikolova, Milena & Popova, Olga, 2021.
"Double-edged sword: Persistent effects of Communism on life satisfaction,"
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More about this item
Keywords
communism; command economy; discrimination; information;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-04-18 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-TRA-2014-04-18 (Transition Economics)
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