IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/amposc/v53y2009i2p477-494.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes

Author

Listed:
  • Milan W. Svolik

Abstract

I examine a fundamental problem of politics in authoritarian regimes: the dictator and the ruling coalition must share power and govern in an environment where political influence must be backed by a credible threat of violence. I develop a model of authoritarian politics in which power sharing is complicated by this conflict of interest: by exploiting his position, the dictator may acquire more power at the expense of the ruling coalition, which may attempt to deter such opportunism by threatening to stage a coup. Two power‐sharing regimes, contested and established dictatorships, may emerge as a result of strategic behavior by the dictator and the ruling coalition. This theory accounts for the large variation in the duration of dictators' tenures and the concentration of power in dictatorships over time, and it contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of power sharing and accountability in authoritarian regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Milan W. Svolik, 2009. "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 477-494, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:53:y:2009:i:2:p:477-494
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00382.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00382.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00382.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wintrobe,Ronald, 2000. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521794497, January.
    2. Matthew Ellman & Leonard Wantchekon, 2000. "Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(2), pages 499-531.
    3. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    5. Myerson, Roger B., 2006. "Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 3-23, January.
    6. Svolik, Milan, 2008. "Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 153-168, May.
    7. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    8. Stokes, Susan C., 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 315-325, August.
    9. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    10. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
    11. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 251-262, Springer.
    12. Myerson, Roger B., 2008. "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 125-139, February.
    13. Jennifer Gandhi & Adam Przeworski, 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation, And Rebellion Under Dictatorships," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 1-26, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2010. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-42, January.
    2. Konstantin Sonin & Georgy Egorov, 2011. "Incumbency Advantage in Nondemocratic Elections," 2011 Meeting Papers 417, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Przeworski, Adam & Rivero, Gonzalo & Xi, Tianyang, 2015. "Elections as a conflict processing mechanism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 235-248.
    4. Gehlbach, Scott & Keefer, Philip, 2011. "Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 123-139, June.
    5. Bove, Vincenzo & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2017. "Political repression in autocratic regimes," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 410-428.
    6. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 302-336, December.
    7. Dorsch, Michael T. & Maarek, Paul, 2015. "Inefficient predation and political transitions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 37-48.
    8. Michael K Miller, 2013. "Electoral authoritarianism and democracy: A formal model of regime transitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(2), pages 153-181, April.
    9. Li Han & Tao Li, 2021. "Marketing Communist Party membership in China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 241-268, July.
    10. Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2014. "Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies," CEPR Discussion Papers 10178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Dorsch, Michael & Dunz, Karl & Maarek, Paul, 2012. "Asymmetric Information and Inefficient Regulation of Firms Under the Threat of Revolution," MPRA Paper 38879, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Dorsch, Michael & Maarek, Paul, 2012. "Inefficient predation, information, and contagious institutional change," MPRA Paper 38759, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Vincenzo Bove & Jennifer Brauner, 2016. "The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(5), pages 609-625, September.
    14. Kai Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2012. "The market for protection and the origin of the state," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(2), pages 417-443, June.
    15. Nobuhiro Mizuno & Katsuyuki Naito & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2017. "Inequality, extractive institutions, and growth in nondemocratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 115-142, January.
    16. Justin Yifu Lin & Wei Wang & Venite Zhaoyang Xu, 2021. "Catch‐up industrial policy and economic transition in China," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 602-632, March.
    17. Zudenkova, Galina, 2011. "Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics," MPRA Paper 30231, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Abbott, Kenneth W. & Genschel, Philipp & Snidal, Duncan & Zangl, Bernhard, 2018. "The governor's dilemma: Competence versus control in indirect governance," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2018-101, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    19. Mark P. Jones & Osvaldo Meloni & Mariano Tommasi, 2012. "Voters as Fiscal Liberals: Incentives and Accountability in Federal Systems," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 135-156, July.
    20. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2010. "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 3-57, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:53:y:2009:i:2:p:477-494. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5907 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.