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Forging Success: Soviet Managers and Accounting Fraud, 1943 to 1962

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  • Harrison, Mark

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

Attempting to satisfy their political masters in a target-driven culture, Soviet managers had to optimize on many margins simultaneously. One of these was the margin of truthfulness. False accounting for the value of production was apparently widespread in some branches of the economy and at some periods of time. A feature of accounting fraud was that cases commonly involved the aggravating element of conspiracy. The paper provides new evidence on the nature and extent of accounting fraud; the scale and optimal size of conspiratorial networks; the authorities’ willingness to penalize it and the political and social factors that secured leniency; and inefficiency in the socialist market where managers competed for political credit

Suggested Citation

  • Harrison, Mark, 2010. "Forging Success: Soviet Managers and Accounting Fraud, 1943 to 1962," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 34, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:34
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Harrison, 2013. "Secrecy, Fear and Transaction Costs: The Business of Soviet Forced Labour in the Early Cold War," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 65(6), pages 1112-1135.
    2. Harrison, Mark, 2017. "Secrecy and State Capacity: A Look Behind the Iron Curtain," Economic Research Papers 269312, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    3. Günther G. Schulze & Nikita Zakharov, 2018. "Corruption in Russia - Historic Legacy and Systemic Nature," CESifo Working Paper Series 6864, CESifo.
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    5. Jo Reynaerts & Jakob Vanschoonbeek, 2022. "The economics of state fragmentation: Assessing the economic impact of secession," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 37(1), pages 82-115, January.

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