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Secrecy, Fear and Transaction Costs: The Business of Soviet Forced Labour in the Early Cold War

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  • Mark Harrison

Abstract

What does it cost to do business under a dictator? In 1949 the Soviet state had entered its most secretive phase. One of the Gulag's most important secrets was the location of its labour camps. As this secret was guarded more closely, camps found it increasingly difficult to do business without disclosing a state secret: their own location. For months and then years Gulag officials worked around this dilemma, expending considerable efforts. Rather than resolve it, they eventually normalised it. This study of the transaction costs of an autocratic regime raises basic questions about how Soviet secrecy was calibrated.

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  • Mark Harrison, 2013. "Secrecy, Fear and Transaction Costs: The Business of Soviet Forced Labour in the Early Cold War," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 65(6), pages 1112-1135.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ceasxx:v:65:y:2013:i:6:p:1112-1135
    DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2013.815417
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    2. Harrison, Mark, 2013. "Accounting for Secrets," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 1017-1049, December.
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    12. Mark Harrison, 2014. "The Fundamental Problem of Command: Plan and Compliance in a Partially Centralized Economy," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: THE ECONOMICS OF COERCION AND CONFLICT, chapter 10, pages 305-323, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    Cited by:

    1. Harrison, Mark, 2013. "Accounting for Secrets," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 1017-1049, December.
    2. Harrison, Mark, 2017. "Secrecy and State Capacity: A Look Behind the Iron Curtain," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 312, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    3. Miller, Marcus & Smith, Jennifer C., 2015. "In the shadow of the Gulag: Worker discipline under Stalin," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 531-548.
    4. Mark Harrison & Inga Zaksauskienė, 2016. "Counter-intelligence in a command economy," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 69(1), pages 131-158, February.
    5. repec:cge:wacage:2018 is not listed on IDEAS

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