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Coordination in Political Machinery under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking and Repression

Author

Listed:
  • Grigory V. Kalyagin

    (Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University)

  • Vladimir A. Kozlov

    (Department of Demography, National Research University - Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus' behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasi- democratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.

Suggested Citation

  • Grigory V. Kalyagin & Vladimir A. Kozlov, 2012. "Coordination in Political Machinery under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking and Repression," Working Papers 0001, Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:upa:wpaper:0001
    as

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    File URL: https://www.econ.msu.ru/ext/lib/Category/x1a/xb1/6833/file/0001.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dictatorship; Stalinism; Repression; Plan; Principal-Agent;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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