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Cults of personality, preference falsification, and the dictator’s dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Charles Crabtree

    (Government Department, Dartmouth College, USA)

  • Holger L Kern

    (Department of Political Science, Florida State University, USA)

  • David A Siegel

    (Department of Political Science and Public Policy, Duke University, USA)

Abstract

We offer a novel rational explanation for cults of personality. Participation in a cult of personality is psychologically costly whenever it involves preference falsification, with the costs varying across individuals. We highlight two characteristics associated with lower individual costs of preference falsification: (i) loyalty to the regime and (ii) unscrupulousness. Different characteristics might serve the regime better in different roles. Using a simple formal screening model, we demonstrate that one’s participation in a cult of personality improves the dictator’s personnel decisions under a wide variety of circumstances. Decisions are most improved when subordinates’ characteristics that better enable cult participation are correspondingly valued by dictators. Dictators who can manipulate the costs that cult participants pay find it easiest to ensure that correspondence. Our model also highlights the importance to dictators of not believing their own propaganda, and their need to offer increasingly extreme acts of cult participation as old acts become normalized.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Crabtree & Holger L Kern & David A Siegel, 2020. "Cults of personality, preference falsification, and the dictator’s dilemma," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 409-434, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:32:y:2020:i:3:p:409-434
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629820927790
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zimmaro, Filippo & Galam, Serge & Javarone, Marco Alberto, 2024. "Asymmetric games on networks: Mapping to Ising models and bounded rationality," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    2. Apolte, Thomas & Müller, Julia, 2022. "The persistence of political myths and ideologies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    3. Torun Dewan & John W Patty, 2020. "Editors’ introduction to JTP issue 32(3)," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 363-365, July.

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