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In the shadow of the Gulag: Worker discipline under Stalin

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  • Miller, Marcus
  • Smith, Jennifer C.

Abstract

An ‘efficiency wage’ model developed for Western economies is reinterpreted in the context of Stalin’s Russia, with imprisonment – not unemployment – acting as a ‘worker discipline device’. The threat of imprisonment allows the state to pay a lower wage outside the Gulag than otherwise, thereby raising the “surplus” left over for investment: this externality provides a reason for coercion over and above the direct productivity of those in custody.

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  • Miller, Marcus & Smith, Jennifer C., 2015. "In the shadow of the Gulag: Worker discipline under Stalin," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 531-548.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:43:y:2015:i:3:p:531-548
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2015.01.005
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    Cited by:

    1. Nikolova, Milena & Popova, Olga & Otrachshenko, Vladimir, 2022. "Stalin and the origins of mistrust," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    2. Ekaterina Zhuravskaya & Sergei Guriev & Andrei Markevich, 2024. "New Russian Economic History," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(1), pages 47-114, March.
    3. Gerhard Toews & Pierre-Louis Vézina, 2025. "Enemies of the People," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 310-342, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Labour discipline; Asymmetric information; Efficiency wage; Soviet Union; Stalin;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • P23 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Factor and Product Markets; Industry Studies; Population
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P27 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects

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