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Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition

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  • R. Pablo Arribillaga
  • Jordi Mass'o
  • Alejandro Neme

Abstract

We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is the finest. For any partition, it falls between these two extremes. We establish two general properties of this new notion and apply it to the simple anonymous voting problem with two alternatives and strict preferences.

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  • R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Mass'o & Alejandro Neme, 2024. "Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition," Papers 2409.05315, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2409.05315
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2023. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    2. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2023. "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1495-1526, July.
    3. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2020. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 512-533.
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