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Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

Author

Listed:
  • Carmen Herrero

    (Department of Economics, Universidad de Alicante)

  • Ricardo Martinez

    (Department of Economics, Universidad de Alicante & Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide)

Abstract

We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents' preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, fair and non-manipulable solutions. We refer to such a family as M-temporary satisfaction methods. Besides, we provide arguments to defend these methods as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called uniform rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmen Herrero & Ricardo Martinez, 2006. "Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked," Working Papers 06.29, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pab:wpaper:06.29
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
    2. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-519, March.
    3. Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
    4. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520.
    5. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 257-291, December.
    6. Carmen Herrero Blanco & Ricardo Martínez, 2004. "Egalitarian Rules In Claims Problems With Indivisible Goods," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-20, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    7. Carmen Herrero & Ricardo Martínez, 2008. "Balanced allocation methods for claims problems with indivisibilities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 603-617, May.
    8. Carmen Herrero, 2002. "General allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: path-independence and related topics," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 19-40.
    9. Thomson, William, 1997. "The Replacement Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 145-168, September.
    10. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
    11. Dagan, Nir, 1996. "A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 255-261, April.
    12. Thomson, W., 1991. "Resource-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Divosion when Preferences are Single-Peaked ," RCER Working Papers 301, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    13. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1994. "Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 229-235, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Teresa Estañ & Natividad Llorca & Ricardo Martínez & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, 2021. "On the Difficulty of Budget Allocation in Claims Problems with Indivisible Items and Prices," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(5), pages 1133-1159, October.
    2. Carmen Herrero & Ricardo Martínez, 2008. "Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 16(2), pages 272-283, December.
    3. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2023. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    4. Vito Fragnelli & Stefano Gagliardo & Fabio Gastaldi, 2014. "Integer solutions to bankruptcy problems with non-integer claims," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 22(3), pages 892-933, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Allocation problem; indivisibilities; single-peaked preferences; standard of comparison; temporary satisfaction methods.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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