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Submission Fees in Risk-Taking Contests

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  • Mark Whitmeyer

Abstract

This paper investigates stochastic continuous time contests with a twist: the designer requires that contest participants incur some cost to submit their entries. When the designer wishes to maximize the (expected) performance of the top performer, a strictly positive submission fee is optimal. When the designer wishes to maximize total (expected) performance, either the highest submission fee or the lowest submission fee is optimal.

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  • Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Submission Fees in Risk-Taking Contests," Papers 2108.13506, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2108.13506
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    References listed on IDEAS

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