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Attraction Versus Persuasion

Author

Listed:
  • Pak Hung Au

    (Department of Economics, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

  • Mark Whitmeyer

    (Hausdorff Center for Mathematics & Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn)

Abstract

We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer’s visit will glean. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game, which, due to the countervailing incentives of attraction and persuasion, generates a payoff function for each firm that is linear in the firm’s realized effective value. If the expected quality of the products is sufficiently high (or competition is sufficiently fierce), this corresponds to full information–search frictions beget the first-best level of information provision. If not, this corresponds to information dispersion–firms randomize over signals. If the attraction incentive is absent (due to hidden information or costless search), firms reveal less information and information dispersion does not arise.

Suggested Citation

  • Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Attraction Versus Persuasion," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202102, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:hke:wpaper:wp2021-02
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    File URL: https://cep.hkust.edu.hk/sites/cep.prod01.ust.hk/files/publications_media/full_paper/WP%202021-02.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Neilson, Ben Oakley & Lee, Steven J., 2024. "Identifying the properties and impact of education on misconduct: Evidence from Australian financial advisers," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).

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