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Juries and Information Aggregation in Dynamic Environments

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  • Esteban Colla-De-Robertis

    (Universidad Panamericana)

Abstract

We study information aggregation through voting in dynamic environments. We show that the voting rule under which an informative vote is a Nash equilibrium entails a time-varying quota, which suggests that efficient information aggregation requires the use of time-varying voting rules. We also show that a time-invariant simple majority quota rule is asymptotically efficient, that is when the size of the committee tends to infinity. We discuss possible applications to the monitoring and managing of natural resources and the environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Esteban Colla-De-Robertis, 2023. "Juries and Information Aggregation in Dynamic Environments," Working Papers 272, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:272
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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/272.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November.
    2. Richard D. Smallwood & Edward J. Sondik, 1973. "The Optimal Control of Partially Observable Markov Processes over a Finite Horizon," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(5), pages 1071-1088, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Condorcet Jury Theorem - Information aggregation - Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes - Management of natural resources - Environment;

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