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Consistent representative democracy

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  • Chambers, Christopher P.

Abstract

We study axioms which define "representative democracy" in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules "partial priority rules." A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can "veto" certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.

Suggested Citation

  • Chambers, Christopher P., 2008. "Consistent representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 348-363, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:2:p:348-363
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    Cited by:

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    3. Olivier Mouzon & Thibault Laurent & Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley, 2020. "The theoretical Shapley–Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 363-395, March.
    4. Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2012. "Gerrymander-proof representative democracies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 473-488, August.
    5. Clemens Puppe & Attila Tasnádi, 2015. "Axiomatic districting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 31-50, January.
    6. Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine, 2017. "The strong referendum paradox," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1707-1731, July.
    7. Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2006. "Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 669.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    8. Antonio Quesada, 2012. "A short step between democracy and dictatorship," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 149-166, February.
    9. Ahn, David S. & Echenique, Federico & Saito, Kota, 2018. "On path independent stochastic choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    10. Chambers, Christopher P., 2009. "An axiomatic theory of political representation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 375-389, January.
    11. Rafael Treibich & Martin Van der linden, 2017. "Trump trumps Bush," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 17-00014, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    12. Mihir Bhattacharya, 2016. "Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 839-861, April.

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