Choosing choices: Agenda selection with uncertain issues
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- Raphael Godefroy & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2013. "Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 221-253, January.
- Raphael Godefroy & Eduardo Perez, 2013. "Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues," Post-Print hal-03473914, HAL.
- Raphael Godefroy & Eduardo Perez, 2013. "Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03473914, HAL.
- Raphaël Godefroy & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2010. "Choosing choices: Agenda selection with uncertain issues," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564976, HAL.
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Citations
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- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2022. "Deciding On What To Decide," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(1), pages 37-61, February.
- Emeric Henry & Charles Louis-Sidois, 2020.
"Voting and Contributing When the Group Is Watching,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 246-276, August.
- Louis-Sidois, Charles, 2015. "Voting and contributing when the group is watching," CEPR Discussion Papers 10912, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emeric Henry & Charles Louis-Sidois, 2020. "Voting and Contributing when the Group Is Watching," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03874216, HAL.
- Emeric Henry & Charles Louis-Sidois, 2020. "Voting and Contributing when the Group Is Watching," Post-Print hal-03874216, HAL.
- repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/4g5hemr5o18g7os4h53mulpcam is not listed on IDEAS
- Ginzburg, Boris & Guerra, José-Alberto, 2019.
"When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 52-64.
- Boris Ginzburg & José-Alberto Guerra, 2017. "When Ignorance is Bliss: Theory and Experiment on Collective Learning," Documentos CEDE 15377, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- Emeric Henry & Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018.
"Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching,"
SciencePo Working papers Main
hal-03393121, HAL.
- Emeric Henry & Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching," SciencePo Working papers hal-03393121, HAL.
- Emeric Henry & Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching," Working Papers hal-03393121, HAL.
- repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4g5hemr5o18g7os4h53mulpcam is not listed on IDEAS
- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2017. "Deciding on what to Decide," Working Papers 973, Barcelona School of Economics.
- repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/4g5hemr5o18g7os4h53mulpcam is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4g5hemr5o18g7os4h53mulpcam is not listed on IDEAS
- Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2017. "Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1477-1506, June.
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Keywords
selection rules; strategic voting; asymmetric information; agenda setting; large deviations; petitions; citizens' initiative; règles de sélection; vote stratégique; information asymétrique; ordre du jour; larges déviations; référendums d'initiative populaire;All these keywords.
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