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Motives For The International Licensing Of Branded Food And Related Products

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  • Sheldon, Ian M.
  • Henderson, Dennis R.

Abstract

Given initial empirical observations of international licensing of food and beer brands, this paper presents a simple game-theoretic model of the motives for licensing. In a situation of complete information, the model suggests that imperfect competition in overseas markets may be an important determinant of a branded product licensing equilibrium, whilst incomplete information about incumbent firms' payoffs and strategies and also repetition of the game may generate a sequence of unsuccessful entry followed by licensing.

Suggested Citation

  • Sheldon, Ian M. & Henderson, Dennis R., 1990. "Motives For The International Licensing Of Branded Food And Related Products," 1990 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Vancouver, Canada 270873, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea90:270873
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.270873
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    3. Dixit, Avinash, 1982. "Recent Developments in Oligopoly Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 12-17, May.
    4. Salop, Steven C, 1979. "Strategic Entry Deterrence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 335-338, May.
    5. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    6. Gallini, Nancy T, 1984. "Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 931-941, December.
    7. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1985. "On the Licensing of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 504-520, Winter.
    8. Easley, David & Masson, Robert T & Reynolds, Robert J, 1985. "Preying for Time," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 445-460, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Henderson, Dennis R. & Sheldon, Ian M., 1991. "The Importance Of And Economic Motivation For The International Licensing Of Branded Food And Related Products," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 22(1), pages 1-8, February.
    2. Sheldon, Ian M. & McCorriston, Steve, 1990. "Imperfect Competition and Strategic Trade Policy in the Food Industries," Occasional Papers 232833, Regional Research Project NC-194: Organization and Performance of World Food Systems.
    3. Dennis R. Henderson & Ian M. Sheldon, 1992. "International licensing of branded food products," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(5), pages 399-412.

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