IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ijethy/v12y2016i1p49-66.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The market for liars: Reputation and auditor honesty

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew McLennan
  • In-Uck Park

Abstract

In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a "two-tier equilibrium" in which "reputable" auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of losing reputation, while "disreputable" auditors accept bribes because even persistent refusal does not create a good reputation. The main findings are: (a) honest auditors charge higher fees, and have economic profits accruing to reputation; (b) as the fraction of auditors who are honest increases, the premium charged by reputable auditors eventually decreases, which diminishes the incentive to refuse bribes; (c) if the fraction of honest auditors exceeds an upper bound, there does not exist a two-tier equilibrium; (d) thus the reputation mechanism may be undermined by entry into the honest segment of the industry, if it is possible; (e) increasing auditor independence increases the upper bound.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew McLennan & In-Uck Park, 2016. "The market for liars: Reputation and auditor honesty," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 49-66, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:12:y:2016:i:1:p:49-66
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ijet.12080
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite & Kotaro Suzumura, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47.
    2. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    3. Palmrose, Zv, 1986. "Audit Fees And Auditor Size - Further Evidence," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 97-110.
    4. Simunic, Da, 1980. "The Pricing Of Audit Services - Theory And Evidence," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 161-190.
    5. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2012. "The Credit Ratings Game," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 85-112, February.
    6. Craswell, Allen T. & Francis, Jere R. & Taylor, Stephen L., 1995. "Auditor brand name reputations and industry specializations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 297-322, December.
    7. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    8. Paul K. Chaney & Kirk L. Philipich, 2002. "Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 1221-1245, September.
    9. Ettredge, M & Greenberg, R, 1990. "Determinants Of Fee Cutting On Initial Audit Engagements," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 198-210.
    10. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    11. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    12. Mathis, Jérôme & McAndrews, James & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2009. "Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 657-674, July.
    13. Francis, Jr & Stokes, Dj, 1986. "Audit Prices, Product Differentiation, And Scale Economies - Further Evidence From The Australian Market," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 383-393.
    14. Michael Firth, 1990. "Auditor Reputation: The Impact of Critical Reports Issued by Government Inspectors," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 374-387, Autumn.
    15. DeAngelo, Linda Elizabeth, 1981. "Auditor size and audit quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 183-199, December.
    16. Franklin Allen, 1984. "Reputation and Product Quality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 311-327, Autumn.
    17. William P. Rogerson, 1983. "Reputation and Product Quality," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 508-516, Autumn.
    18. Phelps, Edmund S, 1972. "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 659-661, September.
    19. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    20. Dye, Ronald A, 1993. "Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditor Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 887-914, October.
    21. Francis, Jere R., 1984. "The effect of audit firm size on audit prices : A study of the Australian Market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 133-151, August.
    22. Coate, Stephen & Loury, Glenn C, 1993. "Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1220-1240, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Farooq Omar & Derrabi Mohamed & Naciri Monir, 2013. "Corporate Governance and Liquidity: Pre- and Post-Crisis Analysis from the MENA Region," Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 1-19, January.
    2. Somdutta Basu & Suraj Shekhar, 2021. "What's In A Name? Reputation and Monitoring in the Audit Market," Working Papers 60, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    3. Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2009. "Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000330, David K. Levine.
    4. Farooq Omar & El Kacemi Youssef, 2011. "Ownership Concentration, Choice of Auditors, and Firm Performance: Evidence from the MENA Region," Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-17, September.
    5. Mahdi Salehi & Ali Mansoury, 2009. "Firm Size, Audit Regulation and Fraud Detection: Empirical Evidence from Iran," Management, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 4(1), pages 5-19.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ray Ball, 2009. "Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting Scandals," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 277-323, May.
    2. Bugeja, Martin, 2011. "Takeover premiums and the perception of auditor independence and reputation," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 278-293.
    3. Vivien Beattie & Alan Goodacre & Ken Pratt & Joanna Stevenson, 2001. "The determinants of audit fees—evidence from the voluntary sector," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(4), pages 243-274.
    4. Joseph Weber & Michael Willenborg & Jieying Zhang, 2008. "Does Auditor Reputation Matter? The Case of KPMG Germany and ComROAD AG," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(4), pages 941-972, September.
    5. Craswell, Allen T. & Francis, Jere R. & Taylor, Stephen L., 1995. "Auditor brand name reputations and industry specializations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 297-322, December.
    6. DeFond, Mark & Zhang, Jieying, 2014. "A review of archival auditing research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 275-326.
    7. Yi-Fang Yang & Lee-Wen Yang & Min-Ning Lee, 2015. "Service Quality, Size, And Performance Of Audit Firms: Consideration Of Market Segments And Business Strategies," The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 9(4), pages 51-66.
    8. Michael Peel & Roydon Roberts, 2003. "Audit fee determinants and auditor premiums: evidence from the micro-firm sub-market," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(3), pages 207-233.
    9. Connie L. Becker & Mark L. Defond & James Jiambalvo & K.R. Subramanyam, 1998. "The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(1), pages 1-24, March.
    10. Ilias G. Basioudis, 2007. "Auditor's Engagement Risk and Audit Fees: The Role of Audit Firm Alumni," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(9‐10), pages 1393-1422, November.
    11. Joseph Weber & Michael Willenborg, 2003. "Do Expert Informational Intermediaries Add Value? Evidence from Auditors in Microcap Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 681-720, September.
    12. Timothy B. Bell & Rajib Doogar & Ira Solomon, 2008. "Audit Labor Usage and Fees under Business Risk Auditing," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(4), pages 729-760, September.
    13. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-578, June.
    14. Butler, Jeffrey V. & Carbone, Enrica & Conzo, Pierluigi & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2020. "Past performance and entry in procurement: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 179-195.
    15. James Ross Booth & Lena Chua Booth & Daniel Deli, 2012. "Managerial Incentives and Audit Fees: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry," Accounting and Finance Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 1(1), pages 1-76, May.
    16. Kwamena K. Quagrainie & Jill J. McCluskey & Maria L. Loureiro, 2003. "A Latent Structure Approach to Measuring Reputation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 69(4), pages 966-977, April.
    17. Johannes Hörner, 2002. "Reputation and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 644-663, June.
    18. Arthur Fishman & Rafael Rob, 2002. "Is Bigger Better? Investing in Reputation," Penn CARESS Working Papers 40893328535d25cf3e69a981a, Penn Economics Department.
    19. Xianjie He & Jeffrey Pittman & Oliver Rui, 2016. "Reputational Implications for Partners After a Major Audit Failure: Evidence from China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 138(4), pages 703-722, November.
    20. Stuart, Iris & Shin, Yong-Chul & Cram, Donald P. & Karan, Vijay, 2013. "Review of choice-based, matched, and other stratified sample studies in auditing research," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 88-113.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:12:y:2016:i:1:p:49-66. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1742-7355 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.