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The International Licensing Of Branded Food Products: A Game‐Theoretic Analysis

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  • I. M. Sheldon
  • D. R. Henderson

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the strategic motivation for food manufacturing firms to license their branded products to overseas firms. Using non‐cooperative game theory, product licensing is modelled in the context of a simple market‐entry game where licensing enters explicitly as a strategy that can be utilised by both a potential licensor and licensee. On the basis of this framework, possible licensing outcomes are derived that describe different motivations for food product licensing.

Suggested Citation

  • I. M. Sheldon & D. R. Henderson, 1992. "The International Licensing Of Branded Food Products: A Game‐Theoretic Analysis," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 368-380, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jageco:v:43:y:1992:i:3:p:368-380
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-9552.1992.tb00232.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:mth:jas888:v:6:y:2018:i:2:p:17-34 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Henderson, Dennis R. & McCorriston, Steve & Sheldon, Ian M., 1993. "Vertical Coordination: Concept, Practice, Theory and Policy Implications for the Agro-Food Sector," Occasional Papers 233157, Regional Research Project NC-194: Organization and Performance of World Food Systems.
    3. Henderson, Dennis R. & Handy, Charles & Neff, Steven A., 1997. "Globalization of the Processed Foods Market," Agricultural Economic Reports 262044, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    4. Henderson, Dennis R. & Sheldon, Ian M. & Thomas, Kathleen N., 1994. "International Licensing of Foods and Beverages Makes Markets Truly Global," Food Review/ National Food Review, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, vol. 17(3), September.

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