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The Dynamics of Marriage and Divorce

Author

Listed:
  • Gustaf Bruze

    (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark)

  • Michael Svarer

    (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark)

  • Michael Yoram Weiss

    (Eitan Bergalas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University and Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark)

Abstract

We formulate and estimate a dynamic model of marriage, divorce, and remarriage using 27 years of panel data for the entire Danish cohort born in 1960. The marital surplus is identified from the probability of divorce, and the surplus shares of husbands and wives from their willingness to enter marriage. Education and marriage order are complements in generating gains from marriage. Educated men and women receive a larger share of the marital gains but this effect is mitigated when their proportion rises. Education stabilizes marriage and second marriages are less stable. As the cohort ages, uneducated men are the most likely to be single.

Suggested Citation

  • Gustaf Bruze & Michael Svarer & Michael Yoram Weiss, 2012. "The Dynamics of Marriage and Divorce," Economics Working Papers 2012-06, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    • Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Aloysius Siow, 2015. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 409-441.
    2. Pavel JELNOV, 2023. "The marriage age U-shape," JODE - Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(2), pages 211-252, June.
    3. Cristina Borra & Martin Browning & Almudena Sevilla, 2021. "Marriage and housework," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(2), pages 479-508.
    4. Jesper R.-V. Soerensen, 2020. "Testing a Class of Semi- or Nonparametric Conditional Moment Restriction Models using Series Methods," Discussion Papers 20-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    5. Foerster, Hanno & Obermeier, Tim & Schulz, Bastian, 2024. "Job Displacement, Remarriage, and Marital Sorting," IZA Discussion Papers 17335, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Salanié, Bernard & Weiss, Yoram, 2015. "Partner Choice and the Marital College Premium: Analyzing Marital Patterns Over Several Decades," CEPR Discussion Papers 10403, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Laurens Cherchye & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen & Selma Walther, 2021. "Where did it go wrong? Marriage and divorce in Malawi," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), pages 505-545, May.
    8. Rafael González-Val & Miriam Marcén, 2018. "Unemployment, marriage and divorce," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(13), pages 1495-1508, March.
    9. Uwe Jirjahn, Cornelia Struewing, 2018. "Single Motherhood in East and West Germany: What Can Explain the Differences?," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 15(2), pages 197-229, December.
    10. Rafael González-Val & Miriam Marcén, 2017. "Divorce and the business cycle: a cross-country analysis," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 879-904, September.
    11. Doorley, Karina & Stancanelli, Elena G. F., 2019. "Marital Status and Retirement: An Empirical Study for France," IZA Discussion Papers 12299, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Ian Smith, 2012. "Reinterpreting the economics of extramarital affairs," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 319-343, September.
    13. Li, Li & Mak, Eric, 2016. "Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage: The Catalyst Effect of Unilateral Divorce," MPRA Paper 83330, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Rafael González-Val & Miriam Marcén, 2015. "Regional unemployment, marriage, and divorce," Working Papers 2015/38, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    15. Blau, David M. & Goodstein, Ryan M., 2016. "Commitment in the household: Evidence from the effect of inheritances on the labor supply of older married couples," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 123-137.
    16. Edoardo Ciscato, 2019. "Matching models with and without frictions : applications to the economics of the family [Modèles d'appariement avec et sans frictions : applications à l'économie de la famille]," SciencePo Working papers tel-03411916, HAL.
    17. Pierre–André Chiappori & Natalia Radchenko & Bernard Salanié, 2018. "Divorce and the duality of marital payoff," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 833-858, September.
    18. Pauline Rossi & Yun Xiao, 2024. "Left over or opting out? Squeeze, mismatch and surplus in Chinese marriage markets," Working Papers hal-04675352, HAL.
    19. Edoardo Ciscato, 2019. "Matching models with and without frictions : applications to the economics of the family [Modèles d'appariement avec et sans frictions : applications à l'économie de la famille]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-03411916, HAL.
    20. Bastian Schulz & Fabian Siuda, 2020. "Marriage and Divorce: The Role of Labor Market Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 8508, CESifo.
    21. Kristin J. Kleinjans & Karl Fritjof Krassel & Anthony Dukes, 2017. "Occupational Prestige and the Gender Wage Gap," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 565-593, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Marriage; divorce; sorting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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