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Matching models with and without frictions : applications to the economics of the family
[Modèles d'appariement avec et sans frictions : applications à l'économie de la famille]

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  • Edoardo Ciscato

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This dissertation aims to shed light on how the institution of marriage has evolved in the United States over the last 60 years. In the first chapter, joint work with Alfred Galichon and Marion Goussé, we extend Gary Becker's equilibrium model of marriage and the family to analyze same-sex marriage and develop an econometric method to study sorting patterns among same-sex couples. We discuss differences in the gains from marriage between same-sex and different-sex couples using a sample of Californian households for the period from 2008 to 2012. In the second chapter, joint work with Simon Weber, we describe mating patterns in the United States from 1964 to 2017 and measure the impact of changes in marital preferences on between-household income inequality. We estimate the strength of positive assortative mating with respect to socio-economic characteristics for different cohorts and answer the following questions: has assortativeness increased over time? If yes, along which dimensions? And to what extent the shifts in marital preferences can explain inequality trends? In the third chapter, I build a novel equilibrium model of the marriage market characterized by search frictions, endogenous divorce, aging and wage mobility. I estimate the model with American data for two separate periods, the 1970s and the 2000s, and then provide a quantitative assessment of the impact of changes in the wage distribution on the decline of marriage observed between these two periods. I conclude by discussing the impact of changes in the wage distribution on the welfare of different population groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Edoardo Ciscato, 2019. "Matching models with and without frictions : applications to the economics of the family [Modèles d'appariement avec et sans frictions : applications à l'économie de la famille]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-03411916, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:tel-03411916
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://theses.hal.science/tel-03411916
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    References listed on IDEAS

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