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Luke Garrod

Personal Details

First Name:Luke
Middle Name:
Last Name:Garrod
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pga712
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/garrodluke/

Affiliation

Economics Group
Business School
Loughborough University

Loughborough, United Kingdom
https://www.lboro.ac.uk/schools/business-school/research-and-innovation/research-strengths/economics/
RePEc:edi:delbouk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Bird, Davina & Garrod, Luke & Wilson, Chris M, 2024. "Consumer protection versus competition: the case of mandatory refunds," MPRA Paper 122125, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Garrod, Luke & Han, Tien-Der Jerry & Harvey, James & Olczak, Matthew, 2023. "Cartel Damages Claims, Passing-On and Passing-Back," MPRA Paper 116469, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Garrod, Luke & Li, Ruochen & Wilson, Christopher, 2023. "Automated switching services," MPRA Paper 118449, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew & Wilson, Chris M, 2020. "Price Advertising, Double Marginalisation and Vertical Restraints," MPRA Paper 102621, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2017. "Market Transparency and Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2017-02, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  6. Luke, Garrod & Matthew, Olczak, 2016. "Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms," MPRA Paper 70647, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2016. "Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited," MPRA Paper 74352, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2014. "Collusion under Private Monitoring with Asymmetric Capacity Constraints," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2014-04, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  9. Chris M. Wilson & Luke Garrod & Alistair Munro, 2012. "Default Effects, Transaction Costs, and Imperfect Information," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-16, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
  10. Luke Garrod & Bruce Lyons, 2011. "Early Settlement and Errors in Merger Control," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2011-05, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  11. Luke Garrod, 2011. "Collusive Price Rigidity under Price-Matching Punishments," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2011-14, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  12. Pinar Akman & Luke Garrod, 2010. "When Are Excessive Prices Unfair?," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2010-04, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  13. Luke Garrod, 2008. "Price Transparency and Consumer Naivety in a Competitive Market," Working Papers 07-10, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
  14. Luke Garrod, 2006. "Surcharging as a Facilitating Practice," Working Papers 06-17, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.

Articles

  1. Maria Rosa Battaggion & Luke Garrod & Monica Giulietti & Luca Grilli, 2023. "Emerging challenges in competition policy and regulation," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 50(2), pages 221-225, June.
  2. Garrod, Luke & Li, Ruochen & Wilson, Chris M., 2023. "Automated switching services," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
  3. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2021. "Supply‐ vs. Demand‐Side Transparency: The Collusive Effects Under Imperfect Public Monitoring," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 537-560, September.
  4. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew & Wilson, Chris M., 2020. "Price advertising, double marginalisation and vertical restraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
  5. Garrod Luke & Li Ruochen & Wilson Chris M., 2019. "Transaction Costs as a Source of Consumer Stockpiling," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(3), pages 1-15, July.
  6. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2018. "Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-25.
  7. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2017. "Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 654-682, September.
  8. Luke Garrod & Bruce Lyons, 2016. "Early Settlement in European Merger Control," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 27-63, March.
  9. Wilson, Chris M. & Garrod, Luke & Munro, Alistair, 2013. "Default effects, transaction costs, and imperfect information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 213-215.
  10. Garrod, Luke, 2012. "Collusive price rigidity under price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 471-482.
  11. Pinar Akman & Luke Garrod, 2011. "When Are Excessive Prices Unfair?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 403-426.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Garrod, Luke & Li, Ruochen & Wilson, Christopher, 2023. "Automated switching services," MPRA Paper 118449, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Anatolii Petrenko & Oleh Boloban, 2023. "Generalized information with examples on the possibility of using a service-oriented approach and artificial intelligence technologies in the industry of e-Health," Technology audit and production reserves, PC TECHNOLOGY CENTER, vol. 4(2(72)), pages 10-17, August.

  2. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2017. "Market Transparency and Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2017-02, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

    Cited by:

    1. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2021. "Supply‐ vs. Demand‐Side Transparency: The Collusive Effects Under Imperfect Public Monitoring," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 537-560, September.
    2. Fagart, Thomas, 2022. "Collusion in capacity under irreversible investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).

  3. Luke, Garrod & Matthew, Olczak, 2016. "Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms," MPRA Paper 70647, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Hattori, Keisuke, 2021. "Profit-Sharing vs Price-Fixing Collusion with Heterogeneous Firms," MPRA Paper 110800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2017. "Market Transparency and Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2017-02, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    3. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2016. "Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited," MPRA Paper 74352, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2021. "Supply‐ vs. Demand‐Side Transparency: The Collusive Effects Under Imperfect Public Monitoring," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 537-560, September.
    5. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2018. "Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-25.
    6. Fagart, Thomas, 2022. "Collusion in capacity under irreversible investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).

  4. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2016. "Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited," MPRA Paper 74352, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2018. "Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-25.

  5. Chris M. Wilson & Luke Garrod & Alistair Munro, 2012. "Default Effects, Transaction Costs, and Imperfect Information," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-16, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.

    Cited by:

    1. Catherine Waddams Price & Catherine Webster & Minyan Zhu, 2013. "Searching and Switching: Empirical estimates of consumer behaviour in regulated markets," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2013-11, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Dohmen, Thomas, 2014. "Behavioral labor economics: Advances and future directions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 71-85.
    3. Mark Harcourt & Gregor Gall & Margaret Wilson & Korey Rubenstein, 2022. "The potential of a union default to influence the preferences and choices of non-union workers in unionised workplaces," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 43(4), pages 1817-1841, November.

  6. Luke Garrod & Bruce Lyons, 2011. "Early Settlement and Errors in Merger Control," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2011-05, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

    Cited by:

    1. Peter L Ormosi, 2011. "Tactical Dilatory Practice in Litigation: Evidence from EC Merger Proceedings," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2011-12, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Peter Ormosi, 2010. "The determinants of merger litigation strategies: An empirical analysis of EC mergers," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2010-01, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    3. Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2008. "Settlement in Merger Cases: Remedies and Litigation," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-10, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    4. Dissanaike, Gishan & Drobetz, Wolfgang & Momtaz, Paul P., 2020. "Competition Policy and the Profitability of Corporate Acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    5. Ormosi, Peter L., 2012. "Tactical dilatory practice in litigation: Evidence from EC merger proceedings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 370-377.
    6. Ormosi, Peter L., 2012. "Claim efficiencies or offer remedies? An analysis of litigation strategies in EC mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 578-592.
    7. Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2015. "Success and failure of bargaining in merger control: The case of asset divestitures," Post-Print hal-01738271, HAL.

  7. Luke Garrod, 2011. "Collusive Price Rigidity under Price-Matching Punishments," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2011-14, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

    Cited by:

    1. Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Actions Speak Louder than Words: Econometric Evidence to Target Tacit Collusion in Oligopolistic Markets," Discussion Papers in Economics 16179, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    2. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Mago, Shakun D., 2019. "Communication and side payments in a duopoly with private costs: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 157-184.
    3. Harrington, Joseph E., 2017. "A theory of collusion with partial mutual understanding," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 140-158.
    4. Wright, Julian, 2013. "Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 91-102.
    5. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2012. "A Theory of Tacit Collusion," Economics Working Paper Archive 588, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    6. Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2015. "Endogenous price commitment, sticky and leadership pricing: Evidence from the Italian petrol market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 32-48.

  8. Pinar Akman & Luke Garrod, 2010. "When Are Excessive Prices Unfair?," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2010-04, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

    Cited by:

    1. Esther L. Kim & Jason Tang, 2024. "Tackling no-shows in fine dining: insights into cancellation policies and consumer awareness campaigns," Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(5), pages 423-434, October.
    2. Svetlana Avdasheva & Dina Korneeva, 2017. "Why Enforcement against Excessive Pricing in the Russian Federation is not Sufficiently Successful?," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 5, pages 117-133.
    3. Willem H. Boshoff, 2021. "South African competition policy on excessive pricing and its relation to price gouging during the COVID‐19 disaster period," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 89(1), pages 112-140, March.

  9. Luke Garrod, 2008. "Price Transparency and Consumer Naivety in a Competitive Market," Working Papers 07-10, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.

    Cited by:

    1. Koki Arai, 2013. "Note on the need for rules on misleading representation based on experimental evidence," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(1), pages 10-17, January.
    2. Joel Slemrod, 2009. "Old George Orwell Got it Backward: Some Thoughts on Behavioral Tax Economics," CESifo Working Paper Series 2777, CESifo.
    3. Kaminski, Bogumil & Latek, Maciej, 2012. "A Simple Model of Bertrand Duopoly with Noisy Prices," MPRA Paper 41333, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Garrod, Luke & Li, Ruochen & Wilson, Chris M., 2023. "Automated switching services," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2021. "Supply‐ vs. Demand‐Side Transparency: The Collusive Effects Under Imperfect Public Monitoring," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 537-560, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Wenzel, Tobias, 2024. "Collusion, inattentive consumers and shrouded prices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 579-591.

  3. Garrod Luke & Li Ruochen & Wilson Chris M., 2019. "Transaction Costs as a Source of Consumer Stockpiling," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(3), pages 1-15, July.

    Cited by:

    1. J. Michael Collins & Amrita Kulka, 2023. "Saving by buying ahead: stockpiling in response to lump‐sum payments," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(4), pages 451-484, December.

  4. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2018. "Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-25.

    Cited by:

    1. Martin, Simon & Rasch, Alexander, 2024. "Demand forecasting, signal precision, and collusion with hidden actions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    2. Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2023. "How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: A machine learning approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    3. Ahamed, Sonya & Galford, Gillian L. & Panikkar, Bindu & Rizzo, Donna & Stephens, Jennie C., 2024. "Carbon collusion: Cooperation, competition, and climate obstruction in the global oil and gas extraction network," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    4. Hattori, Keisuke, 2021. "Profit-Sharing vs Price-Fixing Collusion with Heterogeneous Firms," MPRA Paper 110800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2020. "Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion – An experiment," CEPA Discussion Papers 19, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
    6. Berkay Akyapi & Douglas C. Turner, 2022. "Cartel Penalties Under Endogenous Detection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(3), pages 341-371, November.
    7. Wu, Jiang & Zou, Liuxin & Gong, Yeming & Chen, Mingyang, 2021. "The anti-collusion dilemma: Information sharing of the supply chain under buyback contracts," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    8. Granlund, David & Rudholm, Niklas, 2023. "Calculating the probability of collusion based on observed price patterns," Umeå Economic Studies 1014, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 13 Oct 2023.
    9. Stanislav Stoykov & Ivan Kostov, 2023. "Price Competition with Differentiated Products on a Two-Dimensional Plane: The Impact of Partial Cartel on Firms’ Profits and Behavior," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-25, March.
    10. Ding, Shasha & Sun, Hao & Sun, Panfei & Han, Weibin, 2022. "Dynamic outcome of coopetition duopoly with implicit collusion," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    11. Hamid Beladi & Arijit Mukherjee, 2024. "Losses from horizontal merger and collusion," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 277-289, August.
    12. Leonardo Madio & Aldo Pignataro, 2022. "Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0295, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    13. Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2021. "How do sanctions work? The choice between cartel formation and tacit collusion," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242372, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Leonardo Madio & Aldo Pignataro, 2022. "Collusion Sustainability with a Capacity Constrained Firm," CESifo Working Paper Series 10170, CESifo.
    15. Aleksandr V. Kniaginin, 2018. "Impact of the Antitrust Legislation Interpretation on the Declaration of Firms to be Guilty of Tacit Collusion," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 3, pages 78-89, June.

  5. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2017. "Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 654-682, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Luke Garrod & Bruce Lyons, 2016. "Early Settlement in European Merger Control," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 27-63, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Peter L Ormosi, 2011. "Tactical Dilatory Practice in Litigation: Evidence from EC Merger Proceedings," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2011-12, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Peter Ormosi, 2010. "The determinants of merger litigation strategies: An empirical analysis of EC mergers," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2010-01, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    3. Stephen Davies & Peter Ormosi, 2013. "The Impact of Competition Policy: What are the Known Unknowns?," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2013-07, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    4. Franco Mariuzzo & Peter Ormosi & Richard Havell, 2016. "What can merger retrospectives tell us?An assessment of European mergers," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2016-04, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    5. Prince M. Changole & Willem H. Boshoff, 2022. "Non-competition Goals and Their Impact on South African Merger Control: An Empirical Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(3), pages 361-401, May.

  7. Wilson, Chris M. & Garrod, Luke & Munro, Alistair, 2013. "Default effects, transaction costs, and imperfect information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 213-215.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Garrod, Luke, 2012. "Collusive price rigidity under price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 471-482.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Pinar Akman & Luke Garrod, 2011. "When Are Excessive Prices Unfair?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 403-426.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 7 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (7) 2007-07-07 2016-05-08 2016-10-16 2020-09-14 2023-03-20 2023-10-02 2024-10-28. Author is listed
  2. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2016-05-08

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