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Tactical dilatory practice in litigation: Evidence from EC merger proceedings

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  • Ormosi, Peter L.

Abstract

The economic analysis of delay in legal procedures has received considerable attention in the past. Some of these works focus on the determinants of delay in litigation but very little analysis has been dedicated to examining if tactical delay may actually help the settlement process. The paper shows that in European merger litigation merging parties may decide to tactically challenge discovery attempts, which causes a delay that is strategically used to gain more time to take the necessary steps to avoid a lengthy in-depth investigation. This type of delay can be beneficial to both merging parties and could also contribute to the saving of regulatory resources, and reduce the risks threatening the success of a potentially efficiency enhancing merger.

Suggested Citation

  • Ormosi, Peter L., 2012. "Tactical dilatory practice in litigation: Evidence from EC merger proceedings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 370-377.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:32:y:2012:i:4:p:370-377
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.08.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Florian Smuda & Patrice Bougette & Kai Hüschelrath, 2015. "Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(6), pages 1352-1369, November.
    2. Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea, 2015. "Success and failure of bargaining in merger control: The case of asset divestitures," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 254-259.
    3. Sven Heim & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger, 2016. "The Duration of the EC Merger Control Process: Determinants and the Impact of the 2004 Merger Regulation Reform," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 37-62, February.
    4. Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2024. "Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale," Working Papers halshs-04604840, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Settlement delay; Litigation costs; Antitrust law; EC merger proceedings;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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