IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/e/pgh46.html
   My authors  Follow this author

suman Ghosh

Personal Details

First Name:Suman
Middle Name:
Last Name:Ghosh
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pgh46
http://home.fau.edu/sghosh/web/
Terminal Degree:2002 Department of Economics; Cornell University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
College of Business
Florida Atlantic University

Boca Raton, Florida (United States)
http://business.fau.edu/index.php?submenu=departments_Economics&src=gendocs&link=Departments-Economics
RePEc:edi:defauus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Suman Ghosh & Eric Van Tassel, 2007. "Microfinance, Subsidies and Dynamic Incentives," Working Papers 07001, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  2. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Standard Promotion Practices Versus Up-Or-Out Contracts," Working Papers 06007, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  3. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2005. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions?," Working Papers 05005, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  4. Kameshwari Shankar & Suman Ghosh, 2005. "Favorable Selection in the Labor Market: A Theory of Worker Mobility in R&D Intensive Industries," Working Papers 05006, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  5. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov, 2005. "Can a raise in your wage make you worse off? A public goods perspective," Working Papers 05004, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University, revised Mar 2006.
  6. Suman Ghosh, 2004. "Job mobility and careers in firms," Working Papers 04025, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University, revised Jul 2006.
  7. Raymond Fisman & Suman Ghosh, 2004. "Dynamics of Firm–Supplier Relationships in a Less Developed Economy: Evidence from African Manufacturing Firms," Working Papers 04024, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University, revised Apr 2005.
  8. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2004. "Standard Promotion Practices vs Up-Or-Out Contracts," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 132, Royal Economic Society.

Articles

  1. Ghosh, Suman, 2007. "Job mobility and careers in firms," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 603-621, June.
  2. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2007. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 425-449, June.
  3. Ghosh, Suman & Karaivanov, Alexander, 2007. "Can a raise in your wage make you worse off? A public goods perspective," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 551-571, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Suman Ghosh & Eric Van Tassel, 2007. "Microfinance, Subsidies and Dynamic Incentives," Working Papers 07001, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.

    Cited by:

    1. Emilios Galariotis & Christophe Villa & Nurmukhammad Yusupov, 2011. "Recent Advances in Lending to the Poor with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(9), pages 1371-1390, July.
    2. Philibert Andriamanantena & Issouf Abdou, 2020. "Markovian model for granting credit in microfinance [Modèle markovien d'octroi de crédit en microfinance]," Working Papers hal-02302135, HAL.
    3. Drugov, Mikhail & Macchiavello, Rocco, 2008. "Learning and Microlending," CEPR Discussion Papers 7011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  2. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Standard Promotion Practices Versus Up-Or-Out Contracts," Working Papers 06007, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.

    Cited by:

    1. Josse Delfgaauw & Otto H. Swank, 2014. "Task-specific Human Capital and Organizational Inertia," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-034/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Jeanine Miklós-Thal & Hannes Ullrich, 2014. "Career Prospects and Effort Incentives: Evidence from Professional Soccer," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1432, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Lackner, M. & Stracke, R. & Sunde, U. & Winter-Ebmer, R., 2015. "Are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions? Evidence from the field," ROA Research Memorandum 010, Maastricht University, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).
    4. Oliver Gürtler & Lennart Struth, 2021. "Do Workers Benefit from Wage Transparency Rules?," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 105, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    5. Siegert, Caspar & Trepper, Piers, 2015. "Optimal tolerance for failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 41-55.
    6. Radoslawa Nikolowa & Daniel Ferreira, 2018. "How to Sell Jobs," Working Papers 846, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    7. Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 273-300.
    8. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2020. "A general framework for studying contests," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224601, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    9. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolás Porteiro, 2011. "Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets," Working Papers 11.08, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    10. Jaime Arellano-Bover & Fernando Saltiel, 2024. "Differences in On-the-Job Learning across Firms," Working Papers 317, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    11. Lackner, Mario & Stracke, Rudi & Sunde, Uwe & Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf, 2020. "Are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions? Field evidence from multistage tournaments," Munich Reprints in Economics 84747, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    12. DeVaro, Jed & Fung, Scott, 2024. "The Importance of Luck in Executive Promotion Tournaments: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 17327, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Tom Ahn & Jason Niven & Andrew Veilleux, 2021. "How long have you been waiting? Explaining the role of irrelevant information in the promotion of U.S. Navy officers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(2), pages 604-614.
    14. Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver, 2013. "The optimality of heterogeneous tournaments," Working Papers IF42V1, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institute of Finance.
    15. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Standard Promotion Practices Versus Up-Or-Out Contracts," Working Papers 06007, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
    16. Waldman, Michael, 2007. "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets," MPRA Paper 5113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2016. "Learning-by-Employing: The Value of Commitment under Uncertainty," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(3), pages 581-620.
    18. Michael Waldman & Ori Zax, 2016. "An Exploration of the Promotion Signaling Distortion," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 119-149.
    19. Barlevy, Gadi & Neal, Derek, 2016. "Allocating Effort and Talent in Professional Labor Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 9858, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2011. "Career Concerns with Coarse Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1831, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2012.
    21. Herbertz, Claus & Sliwka, Dirk, 2013. "When higher prizes lead to lower efforts—The impact of favoritism in tournaments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 188-191.
    22. Stanimir Morfov & Manuel Santos, 2017. "A Model of Managerial Talent: Addressing Some Puzzles in CEO Compensation," Working Papers 2017-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    23. Frei, Irina & Grund, Christian, 2017. "Antecedents of Overtime Work: The Case of Junior Academics," IZA Discussion Papers 11065, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    24. Ekinci, Emre, 2022. "Employee entrepreneurship and signaling role of corporate venturing decisions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    25. Jed DeVaro & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "Strategic shirking in competitive labor markets: A general model of multi‐task promotion tournaments with employer learning," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 335-376, April.
    26. Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2014. "Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 145-164.
    27. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 198-210.
    28. Jed DeVaro & Suman Ghosh & Cindy Zoghi, 2018. "Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 389-434, July.
    29. Bond, Timothy N., 2011. "Internal Labor Markets in Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 64496, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 May 2015.
    30. Verboven, Frank & Haeck, Catherine, 2010. "The Internal Economics of a University - Evidence from Personnel Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 7843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    31. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
    32. Michael Bognanno & Eduardo Melero, 2016. "Promotion Signals, Experience, and Education," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 111-132, March.
    33. Atal Vidya & Shankar Kameshwari, 2015. "Developers’ Incentives and Open-Source Software Licensing: GPL vs BSD," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 1381-1416, July.
    34. Cassidy, Hugh & DeVaro, Jed & Kauhanen, Antti, 2016. "Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 140-166.
    35. DeVaro, Jed, 2011. "Using "opposing responses" and relative performance to distinguish empirically among alternative models of promotions," MPRA Paper 35175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    36. Ori Zax, 2020. "Human capital acquisition as a competitive response to the promotion distortion," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(3), pages 496-509, July.
    37. Dickmanns, Lisa & Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver, 2018. "Market-based tournaments: An experimental investigation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 294-306.
    38. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2023. "Overconfidence and Gender Equality in the Labor Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 10339, CESifo.
    39. Ján Zábojník, 2012. "Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 213-240, September.
    40. Daniel Gibbs, 2019. "Selection rates and bureaucratic performance," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 159-181, June.
    41. Chia‐Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2018. "Dynamic performance evaluation with deadlines: The role of commitment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 377-422, June.
    42. Jiang, Kun & Wang, Susheng, 2022. "Internal labor markets with two types of promotion and two tiers of salary: theory and evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    43. John G Sessions & John D Skatun, 2019. "A bonus given: noise, effort and efficiency in a flat hierarchy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2527-2532.
    44. Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2014. "Career Concerns and Market Structure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000929, David K. Levine.
    45. Jed DeVaro & Antti Kauhanen, 2016. "An “Opposing Responses” Test of Classic versus Market-Based Promotion Tournaments," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(3), pages 747-779.
    46. Lehmann, Jee-Yeon, 2011. "Job assignment and promotion under statistical discrimination: evidence from the early careers of lawyers," MPRA Paper 33466, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    47. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
    48. Simon Dato & Andreas Grunewald & Matthias Kräkel, 2021. "Worker visibility and firms' retention policies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 168-202, February.
    49. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Friebel, Guido & von Bieberstein, Frauke, 2016. "The firm as the locus of social comparisons: Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 41-59.
    50. Chen Cohen & Ori Zax, 2022. "Human capital acquisition as a signaling device in promotion competition," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 550-566, May.
    51. Hannes Ullrich, 2014. "Leistungsanreize in Unternehmen," DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus 32, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    52. Marc Gürtler & Oliver Gürtler, 2019. "Promotion signaling, discrimination, and positive discrimination policies," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(4), pages 1004-1027, December.
    53. Jed DeVaro & Antti Kauhanen & Nelli Valmari, 2019. "Internal and External Hiring," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(4), pages 981-1008, August.
    54. David Wettstein & Ori Zax, 2018. "Promotion Policies of Workers who Observe their Ability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2509-2514.
    55. Jaan Masso & Jaanika Meriküll & Liis Roosaar & Kärt Rõigas & Tiiu Paas, 2024. "What Determines The Gender Pay Gap In Academia?," University of Tartu - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Working Paper Series 147, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Tartu (Estonia).
    56. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "A Tenure-Clock Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0919, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    57. Deutscher, Christian & Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver & DeVaro, Jed, 2020. "Firm choice and career success - theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    58. Jed DeVaro & Hodaka Morita, 2013. "Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 227-269.
    59. Jan Zabojnik, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments In Market Equilibrium," Working Paper 1193, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    60. John G. Sessions & John D. Skåtun, 2018. "Shirking, Standards And The Probability Of Detection," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 103-118, April.
    61. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    62. Günter Strobl & Edward D. Van Wesep, 2013. "Publicizing Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 918-932, April.
    63. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022. "Simple equilibria in general contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 264-280.
    64. Prasad, Suraj & Tran, Hien, 2013. "Work practices, incentives for skills, and training," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 66-76.
    65. Christian Deutscher & Oliver Gürtler & Joachim Prinz & Daniel Weimar, 2017. "The Payoff To Consistency In Performance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(2), pages 1091-1103, April.

  3. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2005. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions?," Working Papers 05005, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.

    Cited by:

    1. Garth Heutel, 2009. "Crowding Out and Crowding In of Private Donations and Government Grants," NBER Working Papers 15004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Luca Corazzini & Christopher Cotton & Paola Valbonesi, 2013. "Too many charities? Insight from an experiment with multiple public goods and contribution thresholds," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0171, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    3. Eckel, Catherine & Guney, Begum & Uler, Neslihan, 2020. "Independent vs. Coordinated Fundraising: Understanding the Role of Information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    4. Jun-ichi Itaya & Atsue Mizushima, 2016. "Should Income Inequality be Praised? Multiple Public Goods Provision, Income Distribution and Social Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 6215, CESifo.
    5. Corazzini, Luca & Cotton, Christopher & Valbonesi, Paola, 2015. "Donor coordination in project funding: Evidence from a threshold public goods experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 16-29.
    6. Heywood, John S. & Li, Dongyang & Ye, Guangliang, 2023. "Private provision of price excludable public goods by rivals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 291-307.
    7. Tilak Sanyal, 2016. "Pareto Improving Redistribution in the Case of Private Provision of Multiple Pure Public Goods," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , vol. 5(2), pages 220-230, December.
    8. Clive D. Fraser, 2022. "Faith? Hope? Charity? Religion explains giving when warm glow and impure altruism do not," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(5), pages 500-523, September.
    9. Kundu, Rajendra P. & Pandey, Siddhigyan, 2021. "Multiple Public Goods In Networks," Working Papers 21/345, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    10. Daniel A Brent & Nathan W Chan, 2019. "Local Public Goods and the Crowding-out Hypothesis: Evidence from Civic Crowdfunding," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(3), pages 2142-2154.

  4. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov, 2005. "Can a raise in your wage make you worse off? A public goods perspective," Working Papers 05004, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University, revised Mar 2006.

    Cited by:

    1. Debasis Mondal, 2015. "Private provision of public good and immiserizing growth," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 29-49, June.
    2. Choy, James, 2016. "Religion and the Family: The Case of the Amish," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1114, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

  5. Suman Ghosh, 2004. "Job mobility and careers in firms," Working Papers 04025, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University, revised Jul 2006.

    Cited by:

    1. Waldman, Michael, 2007. "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets," MPRA Paper 5113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bas Klaauw & António Dias da Silva, 2011. "Wage dynamics and promotions inside and between firms," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 24(4), pages 1513-1548, October.
    3. Aviad Tur-Sinai, 2020. "The effect of terror and economic sector in early career years on future career path," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(5), pages 2153-2184, November.
    4. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 59-108, January.
    5. Zaharieva, Anna & Dawid, Herbert & Mitkova, Mariya, 2021. "Optimal Promotions of Competing Firms in a Frictional Labour Market with Organizational Hierarchies," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242337, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Bond, Timothy N., 2011. "Internal Labor Markets in Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 64496, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 May 2015.
    7. Cassidy, Hugh & DeVaro, Jed & Kauhanen, Antti, 2016. "Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 140-166.
    8. Jonathan R. Peterson, 2023. "Employee bonding and turnover efficiency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 223-244, January.
    9. Chen Cohen & Ori Zax, 2022. "Human capital acquisition as a signaling device in promotion competition," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 550-566, May.

  6. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2004. "Standard Promotion Practices vs Up-Or-Out Contracts," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 132, Royal Economic Society.

    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2011. "Career Concerns with Coarse Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1831, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2012.

Articles

  1. Ghosh, Suman, 2007. "Job mobility and careers in firms," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 603-621, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2007. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 425-449, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Ghosh, Suman & Karaivanov, Alexander, 2007. "Can a raise in your wage make you worse off? A public goods perspective," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 551-571, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 6 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (3) 2007-01-14 2007-01-14 2007-01-14
  2. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2007-01-14 2007-01-14
  3. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 2007-01-14 2007-01-14
  4. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 2007-11-24
  5. NEP-DEV: Development (1) 2007-11-24
  6. NEP-INO: Innovation (1) 2007-01-14
  7. NEP-IPR: Intellectual Property Rights (1) 2007-01-14
  8. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy (1) 2007-01-14
  9. NEP-MFD: Microfinance (1) 2007-11-24
  10. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2007-01-14

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Suman Ghosh should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.