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Multiple openings of forward markets: experimental evidence

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We test the strategic motive to sell forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly environments with multiple forward markets. Using random matching, we test two versions of forward markets with finite (Allaz and Vila, 1993) and indefinite number of periods. We find that the results for the Allaz and Vila (1993) model are remarkably close to the predicted theoretical results for both duopolies and quadropolies. We then test a version of the model to allow for indefinitely many periods. There are multiple equilibria in this theoretical model, including both the competitive and collusive outcomes. We find that the initial "collusive hypothesis" is not ratified, and that outcomes are nearly competitive. Sales take place mostly in the first few openings of futures markets. Again, these results hold for both duopolies and quadropolies.

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  • Rassenti, Stephen, 2010. "Multiple openings of forward markets: experimental evidence," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1023, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we1023
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    1. Le Coq, Chloe & Orzen, Henrik, 2006. "Do forward markets enhance competition?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 415-431, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. van Koten, Silvester & Ortmann, Andreas, 2013. "Structural versus behavioral remedies in the deregulation of electricity markets: An experimental investigation motivated by policy concerns," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 256-265.
    2. Schubert, Jens, 2015. "The impact of forward contracting on tacit collusion: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 109-123.
    3. José Luis Ferreira & Praveen Kujal & Stephen Rassenti, 2016. "Multiple Openings and Competitiveness of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(7), pages 1-16, July.
    4. Schubert, Jens, 2013. "The Impact of Forward Trading on Tacit Collusion: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 43768, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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