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Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games

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  • Ferreira, Jose Luis

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  • Ferreira, Jose Luis, 2001. "Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 303-307, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:72:y:2001:i:3:p:303-307
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Greenberg, Joseph, 1989. "Deriving strong and coalition-proof nash equilibria from an abstract system," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 195-202, October.
    2. Ferreira, Jos e Luis, 1996. "A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 249-257, January.
    3. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
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