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Mechanismen der Politik: Strategische Interaktion im deutschen Regierungssystem

Author

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  • Ganghof, Steffen
  • Manow, Philip

Abstract

Nach welchen Mechanismen funktioniert Politik in Deutschland? Die Autoren beleuchten das Zusammenspiel zwischen Regierung, Bundestag und Bundesrat, die Sicherung von Koalitions- und Abstimmungsdisziplin, die Politik des Bundesverfassungsgerichts sowie die politische Kontrolle der Bürokratie. Sie zeigen, inwieweit sich zielorientierte Akteure an institutionelle Anreize und Beschränkungen anpassen und welche wiederkehrenden Muster strategischen Verhaltens in den politischen Prozessen von zentraler Bedeutung sind.

Suggested Citation

  • Ganghof, Steffen & Manow, Philip, 2005. "Mechanismen der Politik: Strategische Interaktion im deutschen Regierungssystem," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 54, number 54.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgs:54
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    Cited by:

    1. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2005. "No exit from the joint decision trap? Can German federalism reform itself?," MPIfG Working Paper 05/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    2. Burkhart, Simone & Manow, Philip, 2006. "Was bringt die Föderalismusreform? Wahrscheinliche Effekte der geänderten Zustimmungspflicht," MPIfG Working Paper 06/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    3. Burkhart, Simone & Manow, Philip, 2006. "Veto-Antizipation: Gesetzgebung im deutschen Bikameralismus," MPIfG Discussion Paper 06/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    4. Fritz Scharpf, 2005. "No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 24, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).

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