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No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?

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  • Fritz Scharpf

Abstract

Germany's unique institutions of a 'unitary federal state', long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a 'joint decision trap' impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high powered bi-cameral Commission set up in Autumn 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyses the misguided procedural and substantive choices that explain the failure of reform, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels.

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  • Fritz Scharpf, 2005. "No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 24, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    • Handle: RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0161
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Viktor Vanberg & Wolfgang Kerber, 1994. "Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 193-219, March.
    2. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1997. "The selection principle and market failure in systems competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 247-274, November.
    3. Lehmbruch, Gerhard, 2002. "Reformstau durch Föderalismus - Restriktionen und Spielräume einer Reform des Bundesstaates," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 82(4), pages 197-201.
    4. Ganghof, Steffen & Manow, Philip, 2005. "Mechanismen der Politik: Strategische Interaktion im deutschen Regierungssystem," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 54, number 54.
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    Cited by:

    1. Friedrich Heinemann & Eckhard Janeba & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Christoph Schröder, 2015. "Who Likes to Fend for Oneself? Revenue Autonomy Preferences of Subnational Politicians in Germany," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 45(4), pages 653-685.
    2. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:44:y:2006:i::p:845-864 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Monstadt, Jochen & Scheiner, Stefan, 2014. "Allocating greenhouse gas emissions in the German federal system: Regional interests and federal climate governance," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 383-394.
    4. Markus Tepe & Pieter Vanhuysse, 2009. "Educational business cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 61-82, April.
    5. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2006. "Nicht genutzte Chancen der Föderalismusreform," MPIfG Working Paper 06/2, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

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    Keywords

    Germany; federalism; constitutional change; multilevel governance;
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