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No exit from the joint decision trap? Can German federalism reform itself?

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  • Scharpf, Fritz W.

Abstract

The unique institutions that make up Germany's unitary federal state, long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a joint-decision trap impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high-powered bicameral Commission set up in the fall of 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyzes the misguided procedural and substantive choices that led to this failure, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Scharpf, Fritz W., 2005. "No exit from the joint decision trap? Can German federalism reform itself?," MPIfG Working Paper 05/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgw:058
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Viktor Vanberg & Wolfgang Kerber, 1994. "Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 193-219, March.
    2. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1997. "The selection principle and market failure in systems competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 247-274, November.
    3. Manow, Philip & Burkhart, Simone, 2004. "Legislative Autolimitation under Divided Government: Evidence from the German Case, 1976-2002," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/11, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    4. Ganghof, Steffen & Manow, Philip, 2005. "Mechanismen der Politik: Strategische Interaktion im deutschen Regierungssystem," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 54, number 54.
    5. Stefan Sinn, 1992. "The taming of Leviathan: Competition among governments," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 177-196, March.
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    1. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:44:y:2006:i::p:845-864 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Monstadt, Jochen & Scheiner, Stefan, 2014. "Allocating greenhouse gas emissions in the German federal system: Regional interests and federal climate governance," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 383-394.
    3. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2006. "Nicht genutzte Chancen der Föderalismusreform," MPIfG Working Paper 06/2, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    4. Friedrich Heinemann & Eckhard Janeba & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Christoph Schröder, 2015. "Who Likes to Fend for Oneself? Revenue Autonomy Preferences of Subnational Politicians in Germany," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 45(4), pages 653-685.
    5. Markus Tepe & Pieter Vanhuysse, 2009. "Educational business cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 61-82, April.

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