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Was bringt die Föderalismusreform? Wahrscheinliche Effekte der geänderten Zustimmungspflicht

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  • Burkhart, Simone
  • Manow, Philip

Abstract

The recently enacted reform of German federalism is supposed to make legislation faster, more efficient and better. To what extent are these expectations justified? In order to assess the likely effects of the reform, this study uses a research design that was recently applied by the Research and Reference Services of the German Bundestag (parliament): we estimate the future effects of the reform by analyzing the impact it would have had on the legislation in the 14th and 15th term of the Bundestag if it had already been been in force at that time. In particular we ask: To what extent would the number of laws requiring the consent of the states' chamber, the Bundesrat, have been reduced? Which type of laws would have been affected by this reduction - the more controversial ones, or the less controversial ones? Which policy sectors would have seen the greatest reduction? How much would the reduction have increased the government's capacity to act effectively? Would the legislative process have been accelerated?

Suggested Citation

  • Burkhart, Simone & Manow, Philip, 2006. "Was bringt die Föderalismusreform? Wahrscheinliche Effekte der geänderten Zustimmungspflicht," MPIfG Working Paper 06/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgw:066
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    1. Burkhart, Simone & Manow, Philip, 2006. "Veto-Antizipation: Gesetzgebung im deutschen Bikameralismus," MPIfG Discussion Paper 06/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    2. Ganghof, Steffen & Manow, Philip, 2005. "Mechanismen der Politik: Strategische Interaktion im deutschen Regierungssystem," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 54, number 54.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marianna Schaubert, 2023. "Do Alimony Regulations Matter Inside Marriage? Evidence from the 2008 Reform of the German Maintenance Law," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 145-178, June.
    2. Schaubert, Marianna, 2018. "Do Alimony Regulations Matter inside Marriage? Evidence from the 2008 Reform of the German Maintenance Law," EconStor Preprints 173193, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    3. Schaubert, Marianna, 2018. "Do Alimony Regulations Matter inside Marriage? Evidence from the 2008 Reform of the German Maintenance Law," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181508, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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