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Why does sharecropping survive? Agrarian institutions and contract choice in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

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  • Mukhamedova, Nozilakhon
  • Pomfret, Richard

Abstract

A century ago, Alfred Marshall demonstrated the inefficiency associated with farmers receiving only a portion of their marginal product. Farmers will supply less labor than under arrangements in which they receive their marginal product; output will be sub-optimal. Explanations of sharecropping are based on market imperfections, e.g., high transactions costs or inability to insure against risk, suggesting that sharecropping should disappear with economic development. Nevertheless, sharecropping survives. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, sharecropping has no legal status but farm surveys provide evidence of its existence. Despite farmers' awareness of the Marshallian paradox, institutional uncertainty contributes to the persistent attractiveness of sharecropping.

Suggested Citation

  • Mukhamedova, Nozilakhon & Pomfret, Richard, 2019. "Why does sharecropping survive? Agrarian institutions and contract choice in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 61(4), pages 576-597.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:206625
    DOI: 10.1057/s41294-019-00105-z
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    Cited by:

    1. Petrick, Martin, 2021. "Post-Soviet agricultural restructuring: A success story after all?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 63(4), pages 623-647.
    2. Akhmadiyeva, Zarema & Herzfeld, Thomas, 2021. "How does practice matches land laws in Central Asia?," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    3. Christelle Yèba Akpo & Cristina Bianca Pocol & Maria-Georgeta Moldovan & Denis Acclassato Houensou, 2024. "Land Access Modes and Agricultural Productivity in Benin," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 14(10), pages 1-20, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sharecropping; Central Asia; agriculture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • J43 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Agricultural Labor Markets
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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