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Determinants of Land Tenure Contracts; Theory and Evidence from Rural India

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  • Ananish Chaudhuri

    (Rutgers University)

  • Pushkar Maitra

    (University of Southern California)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the factors that affect the choice of land tenure contracts in the semi arid tropics of India. We develop a dynamic principal-agent model with one-sided private information to explain the co-existence of wage, rent and share-cropping contracts. We generate empirically testable hypotheses about how multiple contracts can co-exist and we identify household and plot level characteristics that explain such co-existence. Using plot level data from three Indian villages we find that increasing the age of the head of the cultivating household and the value of the plot under cultivation increases the probability that the plot is under tenant cultivation (i.e. cultivated under a share or rent contract).

Suggested Citation

  • Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 1997. "Determinants of Land Tenure Contracts; Theory and Evidence from Rural India," Departmental Working Papers 199710, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:199710
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Narayan Das & Alain de Janvry & Elisabeth Sadoulet, 2019. "Credit and Land Contracting: A Test of the Theory of Sharecropping," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1098-1114.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Principal-agent; Qualitative dependent variable; Share-cropping; Tenurial contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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