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Non-agricultural land use and land reform: theory and evidence from Brazil

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  • Juliano Junqueira Assunção

    (Department of Economics PUC-Rio)

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of nonagricultural land use on agrarian organization and land reform, providing a simple model to determine its policy implications and some evidence on its importance. It is argued that, if land-rental market is imperfect, there is a role for redistributive land policies and the following implications hold: (i) land reform is more probable to enhance efficiency in a low-wage economy; (ii) such policies should aim small farmers instead of landless people, obtaining land from large landholders. Empirical evidence suggests this is a relevant issue in Brazil, specially during periods of high macroeconomic instability.

Suggested Citation

  • Juliano Junqueira Assunção, 2005. "Non-agricultural land use and land reform: theory and evidence from Brazil," Textos para discussão 496, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    • Handle: RePEc:rio:texdis:496
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    land reform; land use; agricultural development;
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