Incomplete contracts and investment : a study of land tenancy in Pakistan
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Cited by:
- Roumasset, James, 2004.
"Rural Institutions, Agricultural Development, and Pro-Poor Economic Growth,"
Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 1(1), pages 1-20, June.
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- Gine, Xavier, 2005. "Cultivate or rent out ? Land security in rural Thailand," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3734, The World Bank.
- Nozilakhon Mukhamedova & Richard Pomfret, 2019.
"Why Does Sharecropping Survive? Agrarian Institutions and Contract Choice in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,"
Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 61(4), pages 576-597, December.
- Mukhamedova, Nozilakhon & Pomfret, Richard, 2019. "Why does sharecropping survive? Agrarian institutions and contract choice in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 61(4), pages 576-597.
- Luis H. B. Braido, 2008.
"Evidence on the Incentive Properties of Share Contracts,"
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- Luis H.B. Braido, 2005. "Evidence on the Incentive Properties of Share Contracts," Development and Comp Systems 0508013, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Holden, Stein T. & Bezabih, Mintewab, 2006. "Tenure Insecurity, Transaction Costs in the Land Lease Market and their Implications for Gendered Productivity Differentials," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25273, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Raul V. Fabella, 2016. "Why Fixed Rent Contracts are Less Prevalent: Weak Third Party Enforcement and Endogenous Principal Type," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201606, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
- Tang, Liang & Ma, Xianlei & Zhou, Yuepeng & Shi, Xiaoping & Ma, Jia, 2019. "Social relations, public interventions and land rent deviation: Evidence from Jiangsu Province in China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 406-420.
- Luis H.B. Braido, 2005. "Risk and Insurance in Sharecropping," Risk and Insurance 0508002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- World Bank, 2007. "Pakistan : Promoting Rural Growth and Poverty Reduction," World Bank Publications - Reports 7984, The World Bank Group.
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More about this item
Keywords
Investment and Investment Climate; Municipal Housing and Land; Contract Law; Economic Theory&Research; Real Estate Development;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-AGR-2006-01-29 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-CWA-2006-01-29 (Central and Western Asia)
- NEP-DEV-2006-01-29 (Development)
- NEP-URE-2006-01-29 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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