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Land Reform and Landholdings in Brazil

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  • Juliano Assunção

Abstract

Land and wealth are closely related in rural Brazil, a country characterized by high levels of inequality in terms of income or landholdings. After presenting a historical retrospective of land concentration and land reform in Brazil, this study evaluates the impact of the land reform programme undertaken in the 1990s on land ownership and land distribution. It is shown that the programme increased landownership among poor rural families and those with less educated household heads, reducing the fraction of the other families with landholding.

Suggested Citation

  • Juliano Assunção, 2006. "Land Reform and Landholdings in Brazil," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2006-137, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:rp2006-137
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    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/rp2006-137.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Paul Faguet & Fabio Sánchez & Marta-Juanita Villaveces, 2015. "Land Reform, Latifundia and Social Development at Local Level in Colombia, 1961-2010," Documentos de Trabajo 12503, Universidad del Rosario.
    2. Sriniketh Nagavarapu, 2008. "Brazilian Ethanol: A Gift or Threat to the Environment and Regional Development?," Discussion Papers 07-039, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

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