The contradictions of unconventional monetary policy as a post-2008 thwarting mechanism: financial dominance, shadow banking, and inequality

The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 has triggered profound changes in the macro-financial regulatory architecture. Ever since, the interplay between political, institutional, and macroeconomic developments has received increasing attention in political economy, as in the evolutionary macro-financial approach of institutional super-cycles with its concept of thwarting mechanisms. While these institutional structures aim to stabilise the macro-financial system, they may also contradict each other due to unintended side effects. This paper argues that the understanding of thwarting mechanisms can be enriched by further integrating it with political economy literature on finance within the post-GFC institutional setup. It conceptualises unconventional monetary policy as a novel thwarting mechanism and analyses the contradictory implications for overall macro-financial stability with a particular focus on aggregate demand. It suggests three reasons why this thwarting mechanism failed to restore sustained economic growth in the post-crisis decade: First, sustained large-scale asset purchases perpetuate the structural drivers of financial dominance in political power relations, entrenching the role of the shadow banking system within the macro-financial order and impairing the development of other thwarting mechanisms. Second, unconventional monetary policy maintains the tenets of the inflation targeting regime and thereby sustains neoliberal macroeconomic governance with restrained fiscal policy. Third, it exacerbates preexisting wealth and income inequality by redistributing wealth towards asset owners, undermines consumer demand, and thus contributes to stagnation tendencies. Thus, this paper suggests that the contradictions of this novel post-GFC thwarting mechanism contribute to weaken economic growth and thus fail to restore macro-financial stability.