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Grey matter in shadow banking: international organizations and expert strategies in global financial governance

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  • Cornel Ban
  • Leonard Seabrooke
  • Sarah Freitas

Abstract

Who controls global policy debates on shadow banking regulation? We show how experts secured control over how issues in shadow banking regulation are treated by examining the policy recommendations of the Bank of International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Board. The evidence suggests that IO experts embedded a bland reformism opposed to both strong and ‘light touch’ regulation at the core of the emerging regulatory regime. Technocrats reinforced each other's expertise, excluded some potential competitors (legal scholars), co-opted others (select Fed and elite academic economists), and deployed measurement, mandate, and status strategies to assert issue control. In the field of shadow banking regulation, academic economists’ influence came from their credibility as arbitrageurs between several professional fields rather than their intellectual output. The findings have important implications for how we study the relationship between IO technocrats and experts from other professional fields.

Suggested Citation

  • Cornel Ban & Leonard Seabrooke & Sarah Freitas, 2016. "Grey matter in shadow banking: international organizations and expert strategies in global financial governance," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(6), pages 1001-1033, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rripxx:v:23:y:2016:i:6:p:1001-1033
    DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2016.1235599
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    1. Blyth, Mark, 2013. "Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199828302.
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    Cited by:

    1. Didier Georgakakis & Frédéric Lebaron, 2018. "Yanis (Varoufakis), the Minotaur, and the Field of Eurocracy," Post-Print halshs-03059237, HAL.
    2. repec:idq:ictduk:14584 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Niamh Hardiman & Saliha Metinsoy, 2017. "How do ideas shape national preferences? The Financial Transaction Tax in Ireland," Working Papers 201710, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.
    4. Wolf, Marcus, 2018. "Ain't misbehaving: Behavioral economics and the making of financial literacy," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 19(2), pages 10-18.
    5. Bernhard Reinsberg & Alexander Kentikelenis & Thomas Stubbs & Lawrence King & Centre for Business Research, 2018. "The World System & the Hollowing-out of State Capacity: How Structural Adjustment Programs Impact Bureaucratic Quality in Developing Countries," Working Papers wp503, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    6. Simon Schairer, 2024. "The contradictions of unconventional monetary policy as a post-2008 thwarting mechanism: financial dominance, shadow banking, and inequality," Review of Evolutionary Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-29, June.
    7. Ridoy Deb Nath & Mohammad Ashraful Ferdous Chowdhury, 2021. "Shadow banking: a bibliometric and content analysis," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 7(1), pages 1-29, December.
    8. Kevin L Young & Timothy Marple & James Heilman & Bruce A Desmarais, 2023. "A double-edged sword: The conditional properties of elite network ties in the financial sector," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 55(4), pages 997-1019, June.
    9. Stefano Pagliari & Meredith Wilf, 2021. "Regulatory novelty after financial crises: Evidence from international banking and securities standards, 1975–2016," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 933-951, July.
    10. William N. Kring & Kevin P. Gallagher, 2019. "Strengthening the Foundations? Alternative Institutions for Finance and Development," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 50(1), pages 3-23, January.
    11. Scott James & Lucia Quaglia, 2023. "Epistemic contestation and interagency conflict: The challenge of regulating investment funds," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(2), pages 346-362, April.

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