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A double-edged sword: The conditional properties of elite network ties in the financial sector

Author

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  • Kevin L Young

    (Department of Economics, 14707University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA)

  • Timothy Marple

    (Department of Political Science, 1438University of California Berkeley, USA)

  • James Heilman

    (Department of Political Science, 14707University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA)

  • Bruce A Desmarais

    (Department of Political Science, 52469Pennsylvania State University, USA)

Abstract

Existing scholarship suggests a deep relationship between elite connections and policy making in the financial sector. But are elite ties between private industry and government a resource for private industry, or a liability? We find that they can be either, depending on the circumstances. We analyze the associations of elite ties within numerous policy-making processes in the financial sector by measuring the network closeness between firms and government regulators. We then relate these measures of network closeness to a range of actual regulatory outcomes, from highly politicized bank bailouts to meetings with regulators both in crisis environments and in more detailed technocratic policy-making. Our findings point to the importance of institutional context in differentiating the role that elite ties might play in different circumstances. Within financial regulatory policy-making, while social ties between firms and regulators matter, they matter in different ways within different institutional contexts.

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin L Young & Timothy Marple & James Heilman & Bruce A Desmarais, 2023. "A double-edged sword: The conditional properties of elite network ties in the financial sector," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 55(4), pages 997-1019, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:envira:v:55:y:2023:i:4:p:997-1019
    DOI: 10.1177/0308518X221127704
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    References listed on IDEAS

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