What do contracts do to facilitate relationships?
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DOI: 10.1007/s42973-023-00132-7
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More about this item
Keywords
Ex ante contracting; Costly contracting; Relational contracting; Scaffolding; Managerial provisions; Formal relational contracts; Long-term relationships;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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