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Modes of communication

Author

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  • Mathias Dewatripont
  • Jean Tirole

Abstract

The paper develops a theory of costly communication in which the sender's and receiver's motivations and abilities endogenously determine the communication mode and the transfer of knowledge. Communication is modeled as a problem of moral hazard in teams, in which the sender and receiver select persuasion and message elaboration efforts. The model is shown to provide a rich set of insights concerning (i) the impact of incentive alignment on communication strategies, (ii) the relative influence and the complementarity/substitutability between issue-relevant communication and cues (information that relates to the credibility of the sender rather than to the issue at stake), and (iii) the path dependency of communication.
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Suggested Citation

  • Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Modes of communication," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9631, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/9631
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. ., 1994. "Firm, Theoru of the (I)," Chapters, in: Geoffrey M. Hodgson & Warren J. Samuels & Marc R. Tool (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics, volume 0, chapter 44, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    9. ., 1994. "Firm, Boundaries of the," Chapters, in: Geoffrey M. Hodgson & Warren J. Samuels & Marc R. Tool (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics, volume 0, chapter 43, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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