IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/busres/v10y2017i1d10.1007_s40685-016-0039-2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Chief human resources officers on top management teams: an empirical analysis of contingency, institutional, and homophily antecedents

Author

Listed:
  • Magdalena Abt

    (Technische Universität Berlin, Faculty VII, H92)

  • Dodo zu Knyphausen-Aufseß

    (Technische Universität Berlin, Faculty VII, H92)

Abstract

Having the director of human resources (HR) as a member of the top management team (TMT) and giving him/her the title of chief human resources officer (CHRO) indicates an important strategic and symbolic choice. Such decisions not only determine who participates in controlling an organization and setting its strategic direction, but also reflect the organizational structure. In this paper, we examine the antecedents of CHRO presence according to the contingency, institutional, and homophily theories. Based on a multi-industry sample of 215 firms that considers a 10-year period, we find that the presence of a CHRO is influenced by the rates of unionization, rapid declines or increases in numbers of employees, the employment of a new or outsider chief executive officer (CEO), and the institutionalization of the CHRO position in the industry or firm. However, we find no evidence of the presumed influence of knowledge intensity or the CEO or TMT human resource management (HRM) experience. Overall, we find that the institutional theory has the highest explanatory power regarding the existence of CHRO positions.

Suggested Citation

  • Magdalena Abt & Dodo zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2017. "Chief human resources officers on top management teams: an empirical analysis of contingency, institutional, and homophily antecedents," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 10(1), pages 49-77, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:busres:v:10:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s40685-016-0039-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s40685-016-0039-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40685-016-0039-2
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s40685-016-0039-2?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bronwyn Hall & Jacques Mairesse, 2006. "Empirical studies of innovation in the knowledge-driven economy," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4-5), pages 289-299.
    2. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    3. Timothy J. Quigley & Donald C. Hambrick, 2015. "Has the “CEO effect” increased in recent decades? A new explanation for the great rise in America's attention to corporate leaders," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(6), pages 821-830, June.
    4. Ronald Dore, 2008. "Financialization of the global economy," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 17(6), pages 1097-1112, December.
    5. Hwang, Byoung-Hyoun & Kim, Seoyoung, 2009. "It pays to have friends," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 138-158, July.
    6. Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, 1999. "CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(5), pages 1829-1853, October.
    7. Robert Strand, 2013. "The Chief Officer of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Study of Its Presence in Top Management Teams," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 112(4), pages 721-734, February.
    8. Neal, Derek, 1995. "Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(4), pages 653-677, October.
    9. Jeffrey L. Coles & Naveen D. Daniel & Lalitha Naveen, 2014. "Co-opted Boards," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(6), pages 1751-1796.
    10. Michael T. Hannan & James N. Baron & Greta Hsu & Ozgecan Koçak, 2006. "Organizational identities and the hazard of change," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 15(5), pages 755-784, October.
    11. Gary S. Becker, 1994. "Investment in Human Capital: Effects on Earnings," NBER Chapters, in: Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education, Third Edition, pages 29-58, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Catherine A. Maritan & Margaret A. Peteraf, 2008. "Frontiers of strategic management research: introduction to the special issue," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2-3), pages 71-77.
    13. Donald C. Hambrick & Albert A. Cannella, 2004. "CEOs who have COOs: contingency analysis of an unexplored structural form," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(10), pages 959-979, October.
    14. Eilbirt, Henry, 1959. "The Development of Personnel Management in the United States," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(3), pages 345-364, October.
    15. Gary S. Becker, 1994. "Investment in Human Capital: Rates of Return," NBER Chapters, in: Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education, Third Edition, pages 59-160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Leydesdorff, Loet & Dolfsma, Wilfred & Van der Panne, Gerben, 2006. "Measuring the knowledge base of an economy in terms of triple-helix relations among 'technology, organization, and territory'," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 181-199, March.
    17. Michel Lander & Pursey Heugens, 2009. "Structure! Agency! (And Other Quarrels): Meta-Analyzing Institutional Theories of Organization," Post-Print hal-00623835, HAL.
    18. Gary S. Becker, 1994. "Age, Earnings, Wealth, and Human Capital," NBER Chapters, in: Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education, Third Edition, pages 228-244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. John Child, 1975. "Managerial And Organizational Factors Associated With Company Performance‐Part Ii. A Contingency Analysis," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1‐2), pages 12-27, March.
    20. Anita M. McGahan & Michael E. Porter, 2002. "What Do We Know About Variance in Accounting Profitability?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(7), pages 834-851, July.
    21. Klepper, Steven, 1997. "Industry Life Cycles," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 6(1), pages 145-181.
    22. C. Chet Miller & Nathan T. Washburn & William H. Glick, 2013. "PERSPECTIVE—The Myth of Firm Performance," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 948-964, June.
    23. Jeremy J. Marcel, 2009. "Why top management team characteristics matter when employing a chief operating officer: a strategic contingency perspective," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(6), pages 647-658, June.
    24. Raymond Caldwell, 2003. "The Changing Roles of Personnel Managers: Old Ambiguities, New Uncertainties," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 983-1004, June.
    25. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    26. David G. Blanchflower, 2007. "International Patterns of Union Membership," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 45(1), pages 1-28, March.
    27. Jie Cai & Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, 2009. "Electing Directors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 2389-2421, October.
    28. Chandler, Alfred D., 1990. "Scale and Scope: A Review Colloquium - Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. By Alfred D. ChandlerJr., with Takashi Hikino · Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. xix + 8," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 690-735, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sven Kunisch & Markus Menz & David Collis, 2020. "Corporate headquarters in the twenty-first century: an organization design perspective," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 9(1), pages 1-32, December.
    2. Olivia Fachrunnisa & Ardian Adhiatma & Heru Kurnianto Tjahjono, 2020. "Cognitive Collective Engagement: Relating Knowledge-Based Practices and Innovation Performance," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 11(2), pages 743-765, June.
    3. Nina Engels & Denise Fischer-Kreer & Malte Brettel, 2022. "CHRO firm dinosaur versus CHRO role gorilla: the effect of CHRO company and role tenure on firms’ social performance," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 92(6), pages 929-954, August.
    4. Stefan Schmid & Simon Mitterreiter, 2020. "International Top Managers on Corporate Boards: Dissimilarity and Tenure," Management International Review, Springer, vol. 60(5), pages 787-825, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sandra Cavaco & Patricia Crifo & Antoine Rebérioux & Gwenael Roudaut, 2014. "Independent directors: less informed, but better selected? New evidence from a two-way director-firm fixed effect model," Working Papers hal-04141284, HAL.
    2. Correa, Ricardo & Lel, Ugur, 2016. "Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 500-520.
    3. Volonté, Christophe, 2015. "Boards: Independent and committed directors?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 25-37.
    4. Crespí-Cladera, Rafel & Pascual-Fuster, Bartolomé, 2014. "Does the independence of independent directors matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 116-134.
    5. Balsam, Steven & Kwack, So Yean & Lee, Jae Young, 2017. "Network connections, CEO compensation and involuntary turnover: The impact of a friend of a friend," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 220-244.
    6. Masulis, Ronald W. & Wang, Cong & Xie, Fei, 2012. "Globalizing the boardroom—The effects of foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 527-554.
    7. Masulis, Ronald W. & Mobbs, Shawn, 2014. "Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 406-429.
    8. Cavaco, Sandra & Crifo, Patricia & Rebérioux, Antoine & Roudaut, Gwenael, 2017. "Independent directors: Less informed but better selected than affiliated board members?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 106-121.
    9. Zhou, Yifan & Kara, Alper & Molyneux, Philip, 2019. "Chair-CEO generation gap and bank risk-taking," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 352-372.
    10. Berger, Allen N. & Kick, Thomas & Koetter, Michael & Schaeck, Klaus, 2013. "Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2087-2105.
    11. He, Wen & Luo, Jin-hui, 2018. "Agency problems in firms with an even number of directors: Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 139-150.
    12. Sila, Vathunyoo & Gonzalez, Angelica & Hagendorff, Jens, 2016. "Women on board: Does boardroom gender diversity affect firm risk?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 26-53.
    13. Stuart, Toby E. & Yim, Soojin, 2010. "Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 174-189, July.
    14. Buchwald, Achim, 2015. "Competition, outside directors and executive turnover: Implications for corporate governance in the EU," DICE Discussion Papers 174, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    15. Anup Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, 2017. "Boardroom Brawls: An Empirical Analysis of Disputes Involving Directors," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(03), pages 1-58, September.
    16. Francesca Sgobbi, 2013. "The Borders of Inter-Firm Mobility for ICT Employees in Italy," International Journal of Human Capital and Information Technology Professionals (IJHCITP), IGI Global, vol. 4(1), pages 34-45, January.
    17. Stuth, Stefan & Schorlemmer, Julia & Hennig, Marina & Allmendinger, Jutta, 2014. "Freiwilliges Engagement: Ein Patentrezept für Wiedereinsteigerinnen?," Discussion Papers, Presidential Department P 2014-007, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    18. C. Michael Aho & Thomas O. Bayard, 1984. "Costs and Benefits of Trade Adjustment Assistance," NBER Chapters, in: The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy, pages 153-194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Vafeas, Nikos & Vlittis, Adamos, 2019. "Board executive committees, board decisions, and firm value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 43-63.
    20. Ana María Ibá-ez, 2014. "Growth in forced displacement: cross-country, sub-national and household evidence on potential determinants," Chapters, in: Robert E.B. Lucas (ed.), International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development, chapter 13, pages 350-387, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:busres:v:10:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s40685-016-0039-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.