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Complete voting systems with two classes of voters: weightedness and counting

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  • Josep Freixas
  • Xavier Molinero
  • Salvador Roura

Abstract

We investigate voting systems with two classes of voters, for which there is a hierarchy giving each member of the stronger class more influence or important than each member of the weaker class. We deduce for voting systems one important counting fact that allows determining how many of them are for a given number of voters. In fact, the number of these systems follows a Fibonacci sequence with a smooth polynomial variation on the number of voters. On the other hand, we classify by means of some parameters which of these systems are weighted. This result allows us to state an asymptotic conjecture which is opposed to what occurs for symmetric games. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

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  • Josep Freixas & Xavier Molinero & Salvador Roura, 2012. "Complete voting systems with two classes of voters: weightedness and counting," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 193(1), pages 273-289, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:193:y:2012:i:1:p:273-289:10.1007/s10479-011-0863-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-011-0863-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carreras, Francesc & Freixas, Josep, 1996. "Complete simple games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 139-155, October.
    2. Freixas, Josep & Zwicker, William S., 2009. "Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 428-444, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 159-173.
    2. Flavio Pressacco & Laura Ziani, 2018. "Proper strong-Fibonacci games," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 41(2), pages 489-529, November.
    3. Xavier Molinero & Maria Serna & Marc Taberner-Ortiz, 2021. "On Weights and Quotas for Weighted Majority Voting Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-25, December.
    4. Freixas, Josep & Kurz, Sascha, 2013. "The golden number and Fibonacci sequences in the design of voting structures," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 226(2), pages 246-257.
    5. Josep Freixas & Marc Freixas & Sascha Kurz, 2017. "On the characterization of weighted simple games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(4), pages 469-498, December.
    6. Freixas, Josep & Kurz, Sascha, 2014. "On minimum integer representations of weighted games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 9-22.
    7. David F. Muñoz & Héctor Gardida & Hugo Velázquez & Jorge D. Ayala, 2022. "Simulation models to support the preliminary electoral results program for the Mexican Electoral Institute," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 316(2), pages 1141-1156, September.

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