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Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity

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  • Roland Pongou
  • Bertrand Tchantcho
  • Lawrence Diffo Lambo

Abstract

We study political influence in institutions where members choose from among several options their levels of support to a collective goal, these individual choices determining the degree to which the goal is reached. Influence is assessed by newly defined binary relations, each of which compares any two individuals on the basis of their relative performance at a corresponding level of participation. For institutions with three levels of support (e.g., voting games in which each voter may vote "yes", "abstain", or vote "no"), we obtain three influence relations, and show that the strict component of each of them may be cyclical. The cyclicity of these relations contrasts with the transitivity of the unique influence relation of binary voting games. Weak conditions of anonymity are sufficient for each of them to be transitive. We also obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for each of them to be complete. Further, we characterize institutions for which the rankings induced by these relations, and the Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices coincide. We argue that the extension of these relations to firms would be useful in efficiently allocating workers to different units of production. Applications to various forms of political and economic organizations are provided.
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  • Roland Pongou & Bertrand Tchantcho & Lawrence Diffo Lambo, 2011. "Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 157-178, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:70:y:2011:i:2:p:157-178
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-010-9211-x
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    8. Josep Freixas & William S. Zwicker, 2003. "Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 399-431, December.
    9. Carreras, Francesc & Freixas, Josep, 2008. "On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 221-234, March.
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    12. Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Joël Moulen, 2002. "Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 313-325, December.
    13. Josep Freixas & Montserrat Pons, 2010. "Hierarchies achievable in simple games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 393-404, April.
    14. Freixas, Josep & Zwicker, William S., 2009. "Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 428-444, November.
    15. Tchantcho, Bertrand & Lambo, Lawrence Diffo & Pongou, Roland & Engoulou, Bertrand Mbama, 2008. "Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 335-350, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Tedjeugang, Narcisse, 2014. "Power theories for multi-choice organizations and political rules: Rank-order equivalence," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 42-49.
    2. Guemmegne, Juliette T. & Pongou, Roland, 2014. "A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: Dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 182-193.
    3. Freixas, Josep & Parker, Cameron, 2015. "Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 144-151.
    4. Freixas, Josep & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Tedjeugang, Narcisse, 2014. "Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 236(1), pages 254-260.
    5. Sébastien Courtin & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2015. "A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(4), pages 617-628, April.
    6. Freixas, Josep, 2012. "Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 89-99.
    7. L. Diffo Lambo & B. Tchantcho & J. Moulen, 2012. "Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 719-731, August.
    8. Josep Freixas & Montserrat Pons, 2021. "An Appropriate Way to Extend the Banzhaf Index for Multiple Levels of Approval," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 447-462, April.
    9. Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack & Bertrand Tchantcho & Bill Proces Tsague, 2019. "On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 647-671, June.
    10. Alaitz Artabe & Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 15-28, March.
    11. Sebastien Courtin & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2019. "Public Good Indices for Games with Several Levels of Approval," Post-Print halshs-02319527, HAL.
    12. Sebastien Courtin & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2013. "A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure," Working Papers hal-00914910, HAL.
    13. Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand, 2021. "Round-robin political tournaments: Abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 331-351.
    14. Freixas, Josep & Marciniak, Dorota & Pons, Montserrat, 2012. "On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(2), pages 367-375.
    15. Luisa Monroy & Francisco Fernández, 2014. "Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 215(1), pages 215-230, April.
    16. Alaitz Artabe & Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 15-28, March.
      • Artabe Echevarria, Alaitz & Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2011. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    17. Sébastien Courtin & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2015. "A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure," Post-Print hal-00914910, HAL.
    18. Parker, Cameron, 2012. "The influence relation for ternary voting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 867-881.
    19. Josep Freixas, 2020. "The Banzhaf Value for Cooperative and Simple Multichoice Games," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 61-74, February.
    20. Josep Freixas & Montserrat Pons, 2021. "On anonymous and weighted voting systems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(4), pages 477-491, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Level-based influence relations; Global influence relation; Multi-choice institutions; Paradox of power; Cyclicity; Anonymity; Transitivity; C70; D71; D20; F50; L23;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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